Prachtige interview om de propaganda,
Смекалка [smekalka], expectations vs reality bij de russen te kunnen zien en het beantwoordt veel vragen om de onbekenden/speculaties te elimineren.
Aan het begin is een plaatje van zijn vorige vertaling over T-90M.
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Ze zien de Westerse "trend"/"mode" van langwerpige tank turrets en de munitie wordt in de achteraanbouw (met blow out panels) bewaard. Een gemotoriseerd deurtje gaat open, Westerse lader trekt een pantsergranaatpatroon eruit en het deurtje gaat dicht.
De russische tanks hebben ook zo'n achteraanbouw nodig om het Westen te shockeren met "rusland is mee met de nieuwste innovaties" en om extra munitie mee te nemen zodat ze de carousel autoloader kunnen aanvullen. Geen deurtje nodig, iemand gaat uit de tank klimmen om de munitie langs buiten aan te voeren.
Doet mij denken aan een Franse DIY-creatie, de wielloze aanhangwagen. Dat is een platform, mand of bak dat op de trekhaak steunt. Het scheelt wat tolheffing als je geen extra wielas achter je auto hebt. Je kan daarop extra bagage meenemen en je moet uit de auto stappen om de spullen langs buiten aan te voeren.
In de huidige vertaling valt mij op.
Een Leopard 1A5 (heeft Fire Control System van een Leo2A4 geleend) schiet op 4 à 5 km met 3 schoten betrouwbaar en minder dan 3km is gegarandeerd raak. Het presteert even goed in het donker met thermals.
Leo1A5 – the rifled 105 is without analogues anywhere, very precise. Germans were correct in borrowing Leo2A4 FCS for this upgrade. Really good AT capabilities. Reliable 4-5km hits with 3 shells. <3km it’s practically guaranteed. Same at night with thermals. It works well in AT role in defense, and be used accordingly. Its armor scheme was developed in the 50’s-60’s, with Germans doctrinally focusing on firepower and maneuverability. It has automatic transmission allowing both fast acceleration and decent reverse speed – something that soviet tanks don’t have.
Automatische versnellingsbak dat zowel snel optrekken als redelijke achteruitsnelheid mogelijk maakt. Iets dat de Sovjet tanks niet kunnen.
Als je de overbrengingsverhoudingen en toerental motor doorrekent, dan kan een russische tank in een bepaalde versnelling een bepaalde snelheid halen.
On paper 4.18 kph, de facto 3.5 kph, [achteruit rijden] since fractions start to slip, due to excessive power. Same with first gear forward – 8 on paper, 5.5 de facto.
In werkelijkheid slipt [de koppeling] wegens teveel motorvermogen zetten op een aandrijflijn die teveel weerstand heeft.
Munitie blijft op Sovjet tech levels. Verder dan de 125mm BM42 Mango zijn ze niet geraakt.
>A lot of people are concerned about 105 being underpowered. But as we know, it all comes down to shells. Can we discuss those?
Both Ukraine and russia are stuck in the late soviet period in terms of shell technology. Russian (and Ukrainian) attempts at developing new shells have led to a few prototype examples being tested and accepted into service, but the 125 guns are still using the soviet stuff.
>And what about Svinets?
Both Svitens 1 and 2 require a new ammo tray and elevator, requiring refits. If you want to use Sninets in T-80BVM, you need to remove two standard trays from the carousel and put two new ones in, that cannot use any other shells whatsoever aside from Svinets. If we talk about HE shells, it’s still the OF-26. Moreover, despite the claims that canister shells are somewhere there at the warehouses, not one example was captured. It’s mostly rockets like 9M119M1, OF-26, BM42 Mango. Sure, there were photos of Svinets, but not in the carousel. Like the time when the old tanks got them, but they couldn’t use them, leaving them without shells. You need to have people who understand who needs what.
Er zijn plaatjes van 3BM48 "Svinets" en 3BM60 "Svinets-2". Maar de autoloader moet zodanig omgebouwd worden, dat het niets meer van de bestaande munitie kan slikken. Een tank converteren tot alleen maar zeldzame nieuwe munitie schieten doe je niet. Dus je vindt in Oekraïne geen enkel voorbeeld van een tank met een aangepaste autoloader.
Is de 105mm L7 underpowered? De Leopard 1 is geleverd met moderne munitie dat niet voor de Mango moet onderdoen.
>So what about Leo1 shells?
The shells we got are no worse than Mango.
>There was info that we might have received M1056 from Belgium? Those supposedly pen something like 500mm RHA equivalent?
This is really good. If a soviet tank get’s hit in the turret cheek with this APFSDF, if might not pen, but the tank will not be mission effective. The shock of the hit will be enough to disable a lot of equipment, like gyros, or engines shutting off.
En als het niet penetreert, dan geeft het een Sovjet tank dermate grote klap dat de gyroscopen van een gun stabilizer of de motor stopt met werken. Als een ongestabiliseerde tankkanon naar alle kanten zwaait of een tank rijdt niet meer, dan heb je niet veel aan een tank.
Het is onrealistisch om te verwachten dat de russen Westerse tank armour in de komende 10 jaren kunnen kopiëren. Het is techniek dat de Amerikanen meer dan 15 jaren geleden ontwikkeld hebben. Materiaalkunde staat niet stil.
One should not forget that the Americans developed these technologies more than 15 years ago, and materials science and scientific developments in terms of armor protection in the United States, Britain and other NATO countries have not stopped there. Look at how the armor protection works on the CV90 or on the Bradley M2 ODS. Both infantry fighting vehicle that could withstand things we could never dream of in the Ukrainian or Soviet army.
Westerse panster op een IFV is al wonderbaarlijk spul, overpowered ver voorbij de dromen van het Oekraïense leger of Sovjet leger.
De piek van de Sovjet tank tech tree:
>Let's see what happened to these vehicles in Ukraine. I wanted to add a remark back then, that all these equivalents of armor produced are very conditional. The true potential of ammunition and armor can only be determined by real-life testing. Perhaps the Americans are still keeping this secret because of this, and until the russians fire their ammunition at the real Abrams, they will not know for sure.
I'll give you a small example: the same Americans were well aware that the T-84 tank, which Ukraine produced from '99 to '99 (yeah), was the pinnacle of Soviet tank building. Back in 2002, they purchased four vehicles, which they tested at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and based on the results of this testing, they developed new types of ammunition, realizing that sooner or later the russians would create something like a T-90M, which would roughly match the armor protection of the T-84 or BM Oplot. And this is what we have now encountered on the battlefield, and it turns out that there are ways to counter them, including the M2 Bradley.
De Oekraïners produceerden de T-84 van '99 tot '99 en in 2002 kochten de Amerikanen 4 exemplaren om te testen. Op basis van de testresultaten werd nieuwe munitie ontwikkeld voor just in case dat de russen hetzelfde doen (als de Oekraïners in '99) met de T-90M.
Voor de prijs van een moderne APFSDS shell koop je 4 of 5 goede FPV-drones.
>Don’t you think that this war has shaped the future of tank-building quite drastically? Especially in terms of placing a greater focus on protection from drones and HEAT threats, instead of other tanks and kinetic threats?
We are at a point where drones got so cheap, that a modern APFSDS shell that costs somewhere between 2-5k USD is more than 4-5 times more expensive that a good quality FPV drone. And there are so many of them out there, that it has become imperative to protect tanks and IFVs from those threads, as the battlefield has changed drastically. But we need to remember that this technological gap is only temporary. In a year’s time max, EW, kinetic countermeasures, dedicated protection of the upper hemisphere will be mature enough to be commonplace. Russian have claimed Arena-E is ready, and T-90M turret has hardpoints that can be used to mount kinetic countermeasures for upper hemisphere. But there will obviously be limitations in terms of price, quantity for both interceptors and means of drone detection, as well as organization of integrated battlefield information space. Every crew must know what they have around them, so optima decisions can be taken. And EW only complicates things, as it goes both ways. All this affects employment of armor on the modern battlefield and brings about a very wide range of technical requirements for the future armor. Armor is not going anywhere, since drones can’t do it all, especially when it comes to fortified strongpoints.
Voor elke nieuwe dreiging komen nieuwe tegenmaatregelen en de tank blijft voor wat de tank kan doen dat de drones niet kunnen doen.
Als je kan kiezen tussen miljarden uitgeven om 1 brigade met Westers materiaal en combat management system uit te rusten om samen te werken en +50% effectiever dan Sovjet materiaal te worden. En een dozijn brigades met combat management system uit te rusten om samen te werken en Sovjet materiaal bijna zo effectief als een goed uitgeruste brigade te maken.
>Speaking of which. It's no secret that Abrams is in the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which also operates M2A2 Bradley. Theoretically, it would make sense to have this combat management system, given that both Bradley and M1 are American vehicles and should have the same system?
Again, within the same brigade, when all the BMPs and all the tanks see each other, it would be great. But in addition to this, we need to ensure that the mortar and artillery and army aviation have it. And most importantly, commanders and staffs at all levels must be ready to use all this equipment with maximum efficiency. Because you can pump several billion dollars into one brigade and it will be perfectly equipped, but it’s battlefield effectiveness will be only 1.5 times better than an ordinary brigade armed with soviet weapons. And at the same time, if you pour these several billion dollars into a dozen brigades without a combat management system, we will have dozen brigades of with approximately the same level of effectiveness that the aforementioned one brigade.
Dan is een dozijn brigades van combat management system voorzien de betere keuze.
Over het gewicht van Westerse tanks, reken de gronddruk maar uit
>How did the Abrams perform in Donbas soils? It’s 60-65 tons after all.
When such conversations come up, I always say: let's calculate the specific pressure on the soil of Soviet and post-Soviet tanks. I take the width of the track, I take the length of the bearing surface, and I take the combat weight of a T-90M tank. And as a result, we get 1.6 kg/square meter. The heaviest Abrams has something like 1.035 kg/sqm.
Als een Amerikaanse . naar onze , vertaalt wordt. Dan gaat het hier over de grootteorde van ongeveer 1 kg per cm². Met bredere rupsbanden wordt het gewicht uitgespreid en gronddruk verlaagd.
Is de totale massa niet teveel voor de bruggen? Je kan daarmee op verschillende manieren rekening houden.
>But the total mass is greater and there is still a need for vehicles to cross bridges?
Firstly, there is a possibility to plan routes taking into account the load-bearing capacity of bridges, secondly, to use means to increase the load-bearing capacity of bridges, and thirdly, to use engineering equipment where it is necessary to build a pontoon bridges.
>But almost all of them are Soviet, and they were designed for Soviet tanks?
They were designed for a standard weight of 60 tons. But experience shows that there is a 20% margin. Moreover, along with the tanks, we received engineering support vehicles, including Abrams-based mechanized bridges. The Americans approached the problem comprehensively. Yes, they did not give us a battalion of 44 vehicles, but only 31 vehicles, but as for the ARVs and engineering vehicles, they gave us enough.
Sovjet bruggen waren voor 60 ton ontworpen en uit ervaring weten ze dat er 20% marge (+12 ton) erop zit. De Amerikanen hebben bruggenleggers voor het gewicht van een M1 Abrams gegeven.
Hoe zit het met de kerosine?
>We also know that the main fuel of Abrams is kerosene, not diesel, which is used by most vehicles. How is the situation with this?
It all depends on how well the commanders and fuel supply people understand the sequence and duration of this or that equipment working, and what are the reserves in the rear echelons and in what places the fuel will be needed. There should be no problems with this at all.
>I understand correctly that our Ukrainian Abrams continue to work on kerosine?
I think so.
>That's interesting. But it just turns out that a whole supply line has been built for a separate brigade?
Wait, what about the T-80BV tanks?
>Do they run on diesel fuel now?
The quality of our diesel fuel is such that if we used diesel fuel of the same quality as the one we put into tanks with multi-fuel engines like 5TDF, V46, V84 or V92SF2, these gas turbines would have been out of service long ago. Even the T-80BVM and T-80BV tanks we took as trophies, run on it, since the armored services and the fuel and lubrication services of the respective brigades had the foresight to use kerosene
Er is al kerosine voor de gas turbine in de T-80BV.
We weten dat tank vs tank gevechten heel zeldzaam zijn. Waarvoor zijn staafpenetratoren goed voor?
>A question from the audience: did depleted uranium shells prove themselves in any way and is there any place for armor-piercing shells at all, given that we hardly see any direct tank battles?
DU shells have proven themselves in any case. It is not necessary to shoot at a tank, because there are fortifications with meters of concrete. Concrete-piercing shells, as a separate class, are now practically not used anywhere in any country. Because they have probably outlived their usefulness, while APFSDS that can penetrate several meters of reinforced concrete are a normal phenomenon. Moreover, DU has pyrophoric properties. When it flies into the armored space, it simply explodes from internal tension, and all that dust and shrapnel ignites and sets fire to everything there. This is to say that I don't think it's worth inventing something better or abandoning something that works quite well. There is a small problem that there are very few high-explosive shells in the west. There are various types of HEAT, shrapnel shells, and what are now called universal shells, where the armor penetration is quite high and then there are explosives explode. Tanks are not designed to perform artillery tasks on the battlefield. They are used primarily to destroy fortifications, firing points that are very well protected and cannot be destroyed by small arms. Nowadays, infantry is saturated with various means to fight enemy personnel, ranging from assault rifles, assault rifles, automatic grenade launchers to mortars and of course artillery.
Door meters aan gewapend beton slaan. De tanks zijn er niet om de rol van de artillerie over te nemen en de infanterie heeft veel tools om vijandelijke personeel uit te schakelen. De tank wordt voornamelijk gebruikt om vijandelijk fortificaties, bunkers,... uit te schakelen. Er zijn doelen dat niet door small arms uitgeschakeld kan worden.
Doet mij denken aan hoe de
Pz.Kpfw. IV begonnen was. Met een korte
7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 om de infanterie te ondersteunen met het uitschakelen van doelen die niet met small arms uit te schakelen is.
We hebben beelden gezien van tanks die een hele carousel aan HE shells op loopgraven spammen.
>And yet, today's main task of tank units is to move to a firing position and unload a carousel of HE shells in the direction of the enemy. In this context, the Abrams ammunition is not very suitable for such tasks.
I understand this. Unfortunately, this is due to the lack of artillery and mortars and the lack of ammunition for them. If the commander of an infantry or mechanized battalion had a 120 mm mortar battery with 4 or 6 mortars and at least 120-150 rounds per barrel per day, he would not need tanks that go to the position and fire at the fortifications. The problem is here.
Dat komt door tekort aan artillerie, mortieren en bijhorende munitie.
Waarin zit het verschil in bescherming voor de bemanning tussen Sovjet en Westerse APC's en IFV's?
>What is the reason for this, how can it be explained?
Better design thinking, the use of spaced armor...
>Let's maybe explain what spaced armor is?
What is the purpose a BMP-1, BTR-60, BTR-70 or BTR-80 – they need to advance forward. The front armor plate of those vehicles in 11 mm, and then right behind it there are people sitting there. And if something penetrates this armor, it flies further and hits these people, or it also tears off fragments of this armor, and in addition to the actual ammunition, there are fragments of armor, spalling. In the West, to lighten the armor layer, they used aluminum, which appeared in the Soviet Union only on the BMP-3. But again, it's all about technology. On Western BMPs, it is a layer of armor, followed by some polymeric material or air, then another layer of armor, then kevlar anti-spalling liner. And all this together gives results three, four, five times better than just 11-13 mm of soviet medium hardness armor steel. The variation is due to the Soviet standards, because they are also different, but it was calculated that the frontal armor of the BMP-1/2 should withstand .50 cal fire from a distance of 300 meters and beyond. However, for “some reason” it does not withstand it even from 500 meters.
Sovjets gebruiken graag 1 laag 11 tot 13 mm gemiddelde hardheid staal (klinkt zachter dan de
high tensile steel in je auto en Westerse artilleriegranaten met dunnere lichtere wanden en meer ruimte voor enkele kg meer explosieven) en de mensen zitten achter zo'n staalplaat. Westerse pantservoertuigen hebben een ruimte waar kogelpunten kunnen kantelen en slaan met de zijkant tegen de tweede pantserplaat. Er zit nog kelvar achter de tweede pantserplaat om
spalling tegen te gaan of op z'n minst te minimaliseren.
Op papier moet de voorkant van een BMP-1 of BMP-2
.50 BMG kogels op 300 meter tegenhouden. In werkelijkheid gaan de .50 BMG kogels op 500m los erdoor.
Het onderstel, de ophanging, tracks,... kan steviger gemaakt worden om te voorkomen dat een explosie onder een voertuig een stuk van de tracks in het interieur slingert. Net zoals we voorkomen dat assen, stuurkolom, onderdelen van de ophanging,... in het interieur van een auto geslingerd worden.
Then there is the arrangement of equipment in the fighting compartments. In western compartments, it is all designed to protect people. The design of the suspension is such that the occupants are not injured when the vehicle has explosion under its hull. The design of the tracks and rubber inserts better withstands the explosion of anti-tank mines, they are harder to break and the tracks do not break through the hull and fly inside the fighting compartment. All of these things combined bring about what we see on the battlefield now, that even when ATGMs hit western IFVs, we lose much less personnel than we lose in soviet armor.
Zelfs ATGM's maken veel minder casualties als ze een Westerse IFV ipv Sovjet IFV raken.
We kennen de fantastische verhalen van taaie Westerse IFV's die tegen heel veel kunnen, de bemanning heeft het overleefd en Bradley's worden na 2 antitankmijnexplosies nog terug in dienst gesteld. Als dat bij een BMP-2 gebeurt, dan is het opengereten.
>We know of almost fantastical episodes, such as those IFV’s withstanding ATGMs or when an IFV takes a tank hit to the front and the vehicle gets destroyed, but the crew survived. And we even know that in the 47th Brigade Bradleys returned to service after two explosions on AT mines, which says a lot about the overall strength of its hull, because if this happened to a BMP-2, it would be is simply apart at the seams.
This is the high quality of materials, welds, construction, design technology and many other factors. I have said many times that there was no basic science in the Soviet Union, it used the scientific achievements of the West and acquired a lot of applied science from soviet scientists who studied in the West and from extremely useful trophies captured during the Second World War. There was a surge from the 1930s to the mid-1960s, and then it all went downhill, and now russia is again without applied science.
Dit komt door hoge kwaliteit, ontwerptechnologie en vele factoren. Er was geen basiswetenschap in de Sovjet Unie. Het gebruikte/importeerde Westerse verwezenlijkingen. Als de Sovjets iets kunnen, dan hebben hun mensen in het Westen gestudeerd of ze hadden tijdens WOII goed gejat.
Nu is rusland terug naar de natuurlijke toestand: no applied science. Zonder heel veel imports uit het Westen, is rusland een agrarische samenleving met extractieve tsaar en maffia die de rest uitzuigt. Eigenlijk niet veel beter dan een gemiddelde dictatuur in Afrika.
Over de beste kaliber snelvuurkanonnen:
>Speaking about firepower, Soviet vehicles have a 73 mm cannon, which is now not a weapon at all, as it turned out, or a 2A42, a 30 mm cannon. When we received Western IFVs, we got a whole range of guns and ammunition from 20 mm in Marder, 25 mm in Bradley and 40 mm in CV90, plus 35 mm CV90 will get here in the future. In your opinion, where is this “golden caliber” that we should adopt and standardize around?
The “golden caliber” is actually ammunition. As long as we don't have ammunition of any caliber, be it 20 mm, 30 mm, 35 mm or 40 mm of the western type, we will have what we have at hand. That is -inferior soviet ammunition. And no matter how clever you are, no matter what the design is, if you don't have ammunition, gunpowder, appropriate explosives, a darts in 20 mm, 25 mm, 30 mm, 35 mm and 40 mm caliber, you will have what you have - a piece of iron flying at a speed of 1000 m/s that can break through the armor of a similar vehicle of a similar class at distances up to 300-500 meters.
Het beste is munitie dat beschikbaar is. Als er niet genoeg munitie is, dan gebruiken de Oekraïners alles dat ze kunnen krijgen. Het gaat uiteindelijk over metalen projectielen die tegen 1km/s het pantser van een voertuig van dezelfde klasse kan penetreren op 300 tot 500 meter.
Bradley vs T-90M.
>But the russians and us still use full-caliber 30 mm ammunition in soviet IFVs, while the Americans have long had sub-caliber 25 mm ammunition with much better performance. And we've already seen this amazing footage of Bradley taking apart a T-90M. By the way, what happened then?
The gunner did well, because he blinded both the gunner and the commander.
>But we could clearly see that it wasn’t only optical devices that were hit, but also the hull, because it seems that the turret was jammed and it was spinning continuously.
When you get two or three dozen of these darts in the turret ring, it simply breaks it.
Naast de optics slopen, gaat de turret ring kapot als je paar dozijn 25mm sabots erin pompt.
>I understand correctly that one of the shells pierced the turret ring?
I suspect that there was indeed a penetration there. It is not armor steel, but structural steel and its purpose is completely different, namely to take vertical and lateral loads so that the turret does not move side to side during rolls and when it turns over, and there are rollers held in two planes that ensure the rotation of the turret relative to the vertical axis. Now the Russians are already starting to use additional elements to protect the turret ring and when modernizing the T-80BVM and T-72B3, they weld on additional structural elements that reduce the gap where the .50 cal, 12.7 mm, 25 mm projectiles can do damage.
Het is geen pantserstaal en ze kunnen extra bescherming erbij lassen om de machinegeweren en snelvuurkanonnen wat moeilijker te maken.
CV-90
>Speaking in the context of the future, we are already starting to think about what the future Ukrainian IFV will be like, or rather what we will buy, with one of the options being the CV90. What can you say about this vehicle based it’s use here?
The platform is very promising. It has absorbed all the best that has been accumulated over three decades of using IFVs in many wars. I think that even in its current version, this is a vehicle that will have the right to live on the battlefield for another 30 years. The Americans are already making the M2A4, and this vehicle is also for another 20 years.
De lessons learned van 3 decennia in vele oorlogen en de huidige versie gaat nog 30 jaren mee. En de M2A4 Bradley is goed voor nog 20 jaren.
>It's a very bad prospect to buy completely foreign machines.
>I think that BAE Systems will be ready to go down the same route the Swedes have gone with the Czechs and Slovaks, that we are ready to cooperate, to localize, that this will give them the opportunity to produce more for cheaper.
>We have heard about a similar memorandum for a 1,000 IFVs.
One thing is a actionable memorandum, and another thing is a memorandum announced for the sake of PR. If there is a real memorandum and there is a prospect of working together and it entails some specific steps and it is clear how to move forward, then this is one thing.
>BAE Systems knows how to play the long game, and that's why they can push this contract through.
They are interested in this, because the Ukrainian market is at least 1,000 vehicles, but realistical much more.
De Oekraïense markt is goed voor minstens 1000 IFV's zoals CV90 en realistisch nog vele keren meer.
Kunnen de Oekraïners nog hun eigen technologie, modules, systemen,... in een CV90 stoppen?
Nu is alles voor Sovjet 30mm snelvuurkanonnen gemaakt en er is geen munitie wegens ondermaatse metallurgie.
>How realistic is it to see a very Ukrainianized version of the CV90? We could take the CV90 platform and use our technologies, talking about the combat module, the combat systems.
The combat modules we are currently producing all have soviet 30 mm cannons. There is no ammunition, the quality of metallurgy is meh. The 7.62mm machine guns will live for another 2-3 decades, although with the protective equipment that the infantry already wears, this is not enough, and we need a slightly more powerful caliber, at least 8.3 or 8.5.
>Are you talking about how the Americans are testing .338 machine guns now?
They understand what they are doing. In a decade and a half or two, infantry protective equipment will probably include exoskeletons, and the infantry will become knights of sorts, using everything that is remotely controlled. You need to understand what you will face on the battlefield, what density fires will be there and the armor-piercing capability of conventional small arms you will face. Therefore, there is no chance that we will put our combat module on any chassis. The best we can do is at least try to compete in terms of ATGMs and thermal imaging.
Machinegeweren kunnen nog 2 of 3 decennia mee, maar de infanterie dragen al te goede bescherming zodat een overstap naar een grotere kaliber machinegeweren nodig is. De verwachting is dat infanterie met exoskeletons en pantser zoals ridders eraan komen.
.338 Lapua Magnum patronen (bekend van de
AWM) kunnen verbeterd worden met een grotere zwaardere kogelpunt (300 ipv 250 grains).
The .338 Norma Magnum was designed to improve upon the .338 Lapua Magnum when loaded with 19.44 g (300 gr) Sierra very-low-drag bullets in magazines and actions that restrict the .338 Lapua Magnum's maximum cartridge overall length
Wikipedia: .338 Norma Magnum
Very-low-drag kogelpunten behouden hun snelheid en energie beter zodat het een hardere klap op afstand kan uitdelen. Alsof dat je met een grotere kaliber schiet.
Dit wordt voor een bolt-action sniper rifle (
Barrett MRAD) gebruikt.
En in een machinegeweer die 600 schoten per minuut doet: SIG Sauer MG 338
The SIG MG 338 is primarily chambered in .338 Norma Magnum and has an effective range of approximately 1,700 meters, approximately twice the effective range of 7.62x51mm, while at 1,000 meters, it is still capable of penetrating Level III armor.[1] The MG 338 can be switched to fire 7.62×51mm by changing out the barrel, bolt, feed tray, and cover.[2] It weighs approximately 10 kilograms (22 lb) which is significantly less than the preceding M240. The MG 338 uses a short stroke gas piston operating system and is select fire being capable of both automatic and semi-automatic fire.[3]
Wikipedia: SIG Sauer MG 338
Het weegt merkbaar minder dan een M240, verdubbelt bijna het effectief bereik en op 1000m afstand kan het Level III armor penetreren.
In 2017 United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) issued a solicitation for a .338 Norma Magnum machine gun.[9] This was in response to the need for overmatch when examining the capabilities of the 5.56×45mm and 7.62×51mm rounds compared to 7.62×54mmR.[10] The MG 338 was planned to have a similar weight to the M240 but, with the .338 Norma Mag, deliver terminal effects on targets similar to that of the .50 BMG.[11][12] Programs for acquisition of .338 Norma Mag ammunition began in 2018.[13][14] Acquisition of the weapon system began in 2019.[15] The MG 338 was first unveiled at AUSA 2018.[16]
Het is bedoeld om nog extremere overkill mogelijk te maken. De vijand moet de aankomende kogelpunten ervaren alsof ze door .50 BMG geraakt worden. Normaal gezien gebruik je .50 BMG om door motorblokken, straalmotoren,... te schieten om voertuigen en andere materiaal uit te schakelen.
Het lijkt wel Helldivers 2, dan is het wel nodig dat de machinegeweren de robots, automatons, pijn kunnen doen. Daarop zijn de Amerikanen al aan het voorbereiden. Soldaten met een exoskeleton, bepantsering zoals ridders,... De Oekraïners weten het ook dat hun "slappe metalen", Sovjet erfenis,... weinig bijdragen aan de toekomstige noden. Er zal veel met Westerse wapenfabrikanten samengewerkt worden.
Het contrast wordt alleen maar groter: high-tech Westen/Oekraïne vs no applied science agrarisch rusland.
Ook voor China is het slecht nieuws, het balletje in een balpen is een uitdaging voor hun metallurgie en precisie. De Fransen konden dat in de jaren 40 met Zwitserse horlogemaker's machines al produceren om de BIC balpen in 1950 uit te brengen.
De Westerse wapenfabrikanten gaan het geheim recept (zoals Coca Cola) uiteraard niet weggeven.
>Is there an option to localize Western cannons?
This is much more complicated. You realize that there are several manufacturers in the West who do not want to give up this very tasty morsel. Is Bofors going to give away the technology?
>Could they allow the integration of their product, provided that we buy our modules from them?
If we put in a Bofors or Bushmaster gun, we will need to have a completely different sub-turret sheet, because these are completely different forces at play during firing, a completely different ammunition industry, which we do not have at all. That's why I have a skeptic fighting with an optimist inside of me. I have little faith in such things.
Het is zo goed en veilig geld verdienen als Microsoft met hun Windows en Office licenties/abonnementen. De zekerheid hebben dat namaak kansloos is. Oekraïne zal de snelvuurkanonnen en munitie moeten importeren zoals de bedrijven netjes voor Windows en Office betalen.
Waarom zien we de Bradley in actie, maar weinig CV90?
>There are questions from the audience about how the CV90s performed on the battlefield, and why is there less information about them than, for example, about the Bradley? There is a lot of information about the Bradley, and it looks impressive and serious. What about the CV90?
Let me tell you why. We have brigades that do not disseminate information about the results of their combat activities, and we have brigades that do disseminate information and fight partially live. That's why M2 got into the live broadcasts and everyone knows about it, and CV90 did not, so no one knows about it. In terms of efficiency and security, these IFVs are in the same class.
>I would even add that the CV90 may be better in some ways in terms of protection, because it has composite armor.
In terms of firepower, the CV90 is still more powerful, the fire control system is more modern, and again, there is only one drawback – there is not enough of them. Even though it doesn't get into the media spotlight, I can't call it a drawback.
Er zijn brigades die geen informatie delen en er zijn brigades die wel delen en vechten gedeeltelijk met live uitzending.
Als je kan kiezen tussen 100 Bradley en 100 Abrams?
>There is another question here. It's basically off-topic, but it's also part of our discussion. If you have to choose, is it 100 Abrams or 100 Bradleys? What is more needed at this stage in the war? Bradleys have proven their effectiveness and will be included in new aid packages, but there is no such information about Abrams at the moment.
If we were given 300 BMP-2s and 100 Abrams, and the opposite side had 100 Bradleys, I would take the 100 Abrams. If we are given 100 Bradleys and 100 Abrams, then we should take 100 Abrams and look for where to get BMP-1s and BMP-2s.
Dan wordt het 100 Abrams en ze zoeken de IFV's ergens anders.
Er zijn geen op te knappen tanks in Oekraïense opslag meer.
>By the way, do these "armor deposits" still exist somewhere or not? It seems that we have already dug up everything.
Unfortunately, we dug up almost everything we could have dug up...
>But the Czechs will come to help, just like with the ammunition.
It's also not easy for the Czechs, because they have several contracts that they will have to fulfill anyway and take junk from countries that are willing to give junk even for a symbolic price. And there is another option, for example, a country has 200 BMP-2s, it is ready to give the Czechs half of them hundred BMP-2s as payment for the repair of the other half. But the Czechs will still have to repair two hundred BMP-2s, even if someone else pays for it. It's a big piece of work, even if the first hundred are stretched out over 2-3 years, because we already need them. It's complicated.
De Tsjechen kunnen ook niet veel helpen. Ze zijn volgeboekt met vele contracten en een land kan in natura betalen.
Een land kan 100 BMP-2's als betaalmiddel gebruiken voor de herstelling van de andere 100 BMP-2's. De Tsjechen herstellen 100 BMP-2's voor de klant en de andere 100 BMP-2's voor verkoop aan anderen of donatie aan Oekraïne. Als de eerste 100 over 2 of 3 jaren uitgespreid wordt, dan zijn ze 4 tot 6 jaren bezig.
De oorlog is in een uitputtingsfase en we zijn langzaam de Westerse wapenindustrie aan het stimuleren om productiecapaciteit voor alle wapens op te voeren.
Unfortunately, the war is in its attritional phase, and we are slowly starting to stimulate the capacity of western manufacturers to produce all types of weapons, including armored vehicles. The russians have achieved their goal. And I suspect now that this has happed, they will be buried alive.
De russen hebben hun doel bereikt kan je lezen volgens hun
death cult,
doodsverheerlijking. Als ze allemaal dromen om zoals lemmings in de ravijn te storten of een kernwapen op hun kop krijgen zo gemakkelijk en zoveel als in
World in Conflict, dan hebben ze hun doel bereikt. De russische wapenindustrie is nu aan het pieken en het Westen is aan het beginnen met opschalen.
Straks worden de russen bedolven onder de Westerse wapens en munitie. rusland heeft ongeveer 2 trillion dollar GDP (de zoekresultaten geven een bereik tussen 1,7 en 2,2 trillion dollar) en is kleiner dan de market cap van Nvidia (2,8 trillion dollar). De VS + West-Europa is groter dan 40 trillion dollar GDP en hoeft niet veel moeite doen om rusland te verpletteren.
Als ik de recentste cijfers van het IMF neemt, is de VS + West-Europa al 50 trillion dollar GDP. rusland is volgens IMF 2,06 trillion dollar GDP in 2024.
https://www.imf.org/exter...per/NGDPD@WEO/WEQ/USA/RUS
Als je de geheime en weggemoffelde oorlogsuitgaven meetelt, is de russische defensieuitgaven 10% GDP in 2023.
As we have seen, however, the actual number for military and industrial spending is expected to approach no less than 9.6 trillion rubles. Since there are no indications that other expenditures will increase, it can be assumed that secret expenditures of other agencies will remain in line with the plan. Therefore, war-related expenses are projected to reach 13.3 trillion rubles, equivalent to approximately $160 billion. This represents 8.9 percent of this year’s projected GDP and roughly 40 percent of the budget expenditures (assuming they reach 33 trillion rubles).
It is not only the federal budget that has war-related expenditures. Regions co-fund contractor payments and participate in reconstructing occupied territories. Private companies also contribute. They finance private military units and purchase tanker fleets to circumvent oil sanctions. The population raises funds for various initiatives to provide for the army. Estimating such spending to be at least 2 trillion rubles, we calculate that this year Russia will spend at least 15.3 trillion roubles on war, equivalent to 10 percent of this year’s estimated GDP.
https://www.wilsoncenter....nted-war-budget-explained
Als je de gebruikte cijfers in deze bron doorrekent:
160 miljard dollar gedeeld door 8,9 en maal 10 doet: 180 miljard dollar oorlogsuitgaven en dat is 10% van 1,8 trillion dollar GDP.
1% van meer dan 40 trillion dollar GDP erbij doen, is 400+ miljard dollar per jaar aan bijkomende wapen- en munitiebestellingen. En 1% van 50 trillion dollar GDP is 500 miljard dollar per jaar.
Over de russische productie. Ze kunnen geen serieuze hoeveelheden pantservoertuigen, tanks,... produceren en hebben 500 sights in Belarus besteld.
>We generally see that Kurganmashzavod, the one that makes BMP-3, is supplying batches quite actively. The russians have revived themselves, or are at least talking about this in the media. They talk about the resurrection of Omsktransmash, which has been dead for a long time and was only doing repairs.
Let's face it and let's talk about armored vehicles and tanks. The russians themselves cannot really do anything serious in such numbers. They ordered 500 sights from Belarusians.
>Is this public information, by the way? Are we talking about Sosna-U?
Not only, there are different sights. OmskTransMash only modernizes and restores T-80Bs and upgrades some of the restored ones to T-80BVM standard. And still, it's a maximum of 150-200 vehicles a year.
>They make statements that they want the factory to produce T-80s again or something like that.
We can talk about it. The question is where to get the parts to assemble these T-80s.
Ze kunnen T-80B's refurbishen en naar T-80BVM upgraden. Maar geraken niet aan de onderdelen om nieuwe T-80's te maken.
Wat hebben ze dan niet?
>What is the problem here? They have already shown that they can restore very beaten gas-tube engines, we can see from the production of the T-90M that they can make a new full-fledged turret, they can weld the hull, they can make a chassis. Where is this bottleneck that will not allow them to make the T-80 again?
The loading mechanism (MZ).
>Can't they make them now? Because they appear on the T-90Ms from somewhere, don’t they?
There is a loading machine (AZ) there. These are two different things.
>I don't think it's a problem to put a loading machine on a T-80?
This is a problem. This is a completely different set of weapons. In terms of dimensions, this is a problem. You can't just swap a turret for a turret. There were experimental vehicles, but it's a problem to organize serial production. You have to get so many loading machines from somewhere too. Let's say they manage to organize this and produce 120-150 new cases and turrets a year.
De autoloader en in een T-80 zit een andere autoloader dan in een T-72 of T-90.
>They will still double the production of tanks, if they can do it.
Then they will not be able to repair and overhaul so many tanks as they do now.
>Can they somehow transfer these tasks of restoring vehicles to other armored plants? They have a lot of them.
There's Strelnya, which repairs tanks, and there's Atamanovka (103rd Armor Repair Plant) near Chita, which repairs T-62s, T-72s, BMP-1s, BMP-2s, and BRDM-2s
En als ze de productiecapaciteit voor nieuwe tanks omhoog krijgen, dan is het ten koste van het herstellen en refurbishen.
Hoe ver moet je van een tankkanon staan om niet door de schokgolf verwondingen op te lopen?
>There is one quick question from our audience. How far away from the tank's barrel should one stand when it is firing in order not to lose a body part?
Wait, you can lose a part of your body even at a distance of 12 kilometers when a tank fires an HE shell and it explodes 5-10 meters away from you and a shrapnel cuts off your arm or head. When they shoot and you are standing on the side, people fall off the tower and become deaf because of the perforation of the eardrums. Eyes can pop out of their sockets. There is no need to experiment. You shouldn't even be behind it. It is best to be at least 50 meters away from the end of the barrel, because the shock wave propagates in all directions, sometimes knocking down a people at a distance of 15-20 meters.
>I'll also add this historical note: back in the era of battleships, on the ships with 400 mm and larger guns, there was indeed an instruction not to be near the gun when it fired because people could really be killed by this barotrauma.
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