pro_6or schreef op vrijdag 21 juni 2024 @ 20:36:
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Ik kom aan die wijsheid toen dit bericht vers op Twitter kwam en iemand die ik als goed ingevoerd inschat het zo duidde. Kan de tweet niet meer vinden. Wel bied dit, hoe je het ook bekijkt, iets meer ruimte. Een rode lijn is iets verkleurd/verschoven.
Net even gekeken wat er in de laatste week over de ATACMS op het internet is geschreven. Krijg mijn vinger er niet goed op. Maar ruis zelf is ook een beleidsinstrument

Minder ingevoerde bronnen noemen nog steeds de Amerikaanse beperkingen. Ik haal het in de regel goed ingevoerde (naar mijn indruk tenminste) International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hier aan:
Missile transfers to Ukraine and wider NATO targeting dilemmas
https://www.iiss.org/onli...-nato-targeting-dilemmas/
Van belang: het artikel is van 17 juni jl.
The transfer of the unspecified longer-range variant represents a shift in US policy. The Biden administration was previously hesitant to provide Ukraine with longer-range missiles due to unease over the potential for escalation and because of stockpile concerns.
We hebben al kunnen vaststellen dat unitary warhead ATACMS al gebruikt zijn geweest:
Longer-range ATACMS variants include those equipped with unitary or cluster warheads and all have ranges of up to 300 km. It is unclear which ATACMS variant (or variants) has been transferred. However, the limited area effects visible in imagery of Ukraine’s 30 May strike on ferries in the Kerch Strait, which allegedly used ATACMS, suggests that the transfer might have included a unitary warhead variant. The US may have transferred some of its remaining units of older ATACMS while it replenishes its stockpiles with the newly produced M57 variant, which has reduced stockpile concerns.
Over een aantal Krim aanvallen suggereert het artikel in haar hoofdstuktitel targeting practice:
Recent attacks against southern parts of Russian-occupied Crimea – from ranges close to 250 km from the Ukrainian front line near Kherson – suggest that Ukraine has already used the new missile. On 15 May, Ukraine targeted the Belbek Airbase near Sevastopol and destroyed two MiG-31 Foxhound and up to two MiG-29 Fulcrum combat aircraft and a fuel depot. A week later, Ukrainian forces reported that they had sunk a Project 22800 Karakurt-class missile corvette in Sevastopol Naval Base. According to UK defence intelligence, it was ‘highly likely’ the latter strike used ATACMS along with one-way attack munitions.
Het artikel merkt op dat een aantal landen, waaronder Nederland, hun positie ten aanzien van aanvallen in Rusland toleranter hebben gemaakt. Wel is het onduidelijk of Oekraïne vrij handelen, zonder inmenging van buiten, heeft met hun wapens:
Some of Ukraine’s Western suppliers, including France, the Netherlands and the UK, have recently appeared to soften their stance on this issue, especially since Russia launched an offensive in Kharkiv oblast in May 2024. However, there remain questions to consider – for instance, over whether Ukraine can independently undertake the mission-planning process for the SCALP EG/Storm Shadow and the like.
Met de kennis van 17 juni schrijft IISS over de Amerikaanse positie het volgende:
Despite the apparent shift among some European NATO members, the US appears to be continuing to restrict the use of ‘long-range’ missiles – such as ATACMS – against targets inside Russia. The US has recently authorised Ukraine to use some types of US weaponry for ‘counter-fire purposes’, permitting Ukrainian forces to use artillery (or shorter-range guided rockets launched by High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS)) to strike Russian forces inside Russia that are close to the border and attacking or preparing attacks. However, US officials say that Washington’s policy of not allowing the use of ATACMS or long-range strikes inside Russia ‘has not changed’. Despite this, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that the US may ‘adapt and adjust’ this policy depending on battlefield conditions, hinting at US flexibility in this approach.
Met dit artikel als referentiekader heb je dus nog steeds gelijk

, met misschien als kanttekening de cliffhanger in de laatste regel. Bij de interpretatie van aanvallen kunnen de voor landdoelen te gebruiken gemodificeerde Neptunes nog wat ruis op de lijn veroorzaken:
ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2024Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil depots in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai overnight on June 17 to 18, using domestically produced Neptune missiles against a ground target in Russia for the second time.[6] Sources in the Ukrainian Navy told Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne on June 18 that Ukrainian forces used Neptune anti-ship missiles, presumably modified to strike ground targets, to strike an oil terminal of the Yugneftekhimtransit LLC in the port town of Chushka, Krasnodar Krai overnight.
Desondanks de komende dagen opletten of we iets zien veranderen.