Ik denk het lezen waard, een interview met Andrii Biletskyi, commandant van de Third Assault Brigade, uit de Oekraïense Pravda.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/11/22/7485754/
Ik haal er wat citaten of alinea's uit.
De situatie is zeer moeilijk, niet alleen voor Oekraïne, maar ook voor Rusland. Rusland heeft wel voordelen door de beschikbaarheid van veel meer soldaten (cannonfodder).
Interviewer: First, let's talk about the situation at the front line. Taras Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive Foundation, said that we are currently experiencing the most difficult situation since the spring of 2022. What is your assessment?
Biletskyi: This is indeed the most difficult situation in almost three years of war. To some extent, I would consider it even more difficult than in the spring of 2022.
There are many reasons for this: lack of personnel, insufficient training (pauses).
They keep talking about motivation and so on. Excuse me, but motivation is a matter of professionalism, level of training and trust in all the links that manage a soldier, sergeant, officer.
This is where motivation comes from, not just because a person is patriotic, for example. So the problem is insufficient training, motivation, and, to some extent, insufficient means.
People like to say things like: "We didn't receive enough material and technical assistance".
Let's be honest: the situation is no better for the Russians. All the stories about their ten or seven shells to one of ours are not true.
The Russians have a very problematic situation with weapons and military equipment - weapons, military equipment, armoured vehicles, ammunition, and the quality of ammunition.
However, they have several systemic advantages. One of them is the air component – Russian guided aerial bombs have drastically changed the situation on the ground.
And, of course, human resources play a significant role. The Russians are not advancing because of, let's say, concentrated artillery fire. And not through the massive use of armoured vehicles. It is due to an infinite amount of literally cannon fodder. I say cannon fodder, because the way they use it, it's not easy to call them soldiers.
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Hij verwacht niet dat het Russische offensief langzamer zal gaan gedurende de winter. Russische troepen zullen ongeacht het weer en temperaturen langzaam oprukken. Oekraïne haar beste wapen, drones worden in deze maanden veel minder effectief (door gebrek aan daglicht). Hij stelt dat de situatie misschien moeilijker gaat worden voor Oekraïne.
Interviewer: We are entering the winter period. How will winter affect the intensity of the fighting?
Biletskyi: It will not affect it radically. The weather primarily affects the mobility of vehicles and armoured vehicles: tracked, wheeled, etc.
Adverse weather conditions reduce the possibilities of operations with the use of equipment.
As for the Russian infantrymen, they will continue to act the same way, working in small groups and showing no pity for their fellow soldiers.
Their tasks are shallow breakthroughs, not marches of 50 kilometres. To get out of their hole and occupy our hole 250 to 300 metres away, okay, a kilometre. He [a Russian soldier – ed.] will walk through snow, rain, mud.
For us, the impact of winter weather can be more negative. Due to the lack of personnel and the quality of training, our main means of destruction are drones.
A reconnaissance drone, a large reconnaissance wing, or an FPV are all very dependent on daylight hours. Yes, there are thermal types [with a thermal imager – UP], but there are clearly fewer of them.
The use of drones depends on the wind and air transparency: fog or no fog, rain or no rain, snow or no snow.
So I'm afraid that expectations that the Russians will slow down because of the winter are unjustified.
On the contrary, our defence may become more difficult because our main weapon will lose its effectiveness. Yes, it is harder for the Russian infantryman to move, but on the other hand, he uses weather conditions as a means of camouflage. So there are disadvantages and advantages for the infantry.
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In een eerdere post:
Yakolev in "Strijdverloop in de Rusland Oekraïne oorlog 2024-M11" meldde ik dat Rusland mogelijk in Zaporozhia een aanval gaat doen. Hij zegt dat de situatie gevaarlijk is, maar omdat hij daar niet zit kan hij geen volledige assessment geven.
Biletskyi: From what I know from my brigadier friends, it looks like the enemy will try to advance.
The offensive near Velyka Novosilka helps the enemy to complete its primary operation - the occupation of Kurakhove.
Zaporizhzhia Oblast is an extremely dangerous front. The terrain is flat. If you look at the map, there are almost no large settlements.
And our communications, let's just say, are stretched from west to east. They can be cut. For us, this can be a really significant problem for the whole of Donbas.
As far as I know, over the past few weeks, we have been actively strengthening both the grouping [of forces – ed.] and the fortification efforts there, but this is not enough.
But I don't know the full composition of the enemy's group or the enemy's intentions, just like I don't know the composition of our group.
Biltskyi denkt niet dat de Noord-Koreaanse troepen veel gaan betekenen, zijn ook totaal niet geschikt voor de oorlog die Rusland en Oekraïne aan het vechten zijn. Hij ziet hun industriële bijdrage als veel gevaarlijker voor de oorlog.
Biletskyi: I believe that even if 50,000 of them are involved, it will not radically change the situation on the battlefield.
Let me explain: we are using new high-precision and cheap munitions. An FPV drone can now cost as little as US$300.
The types of field fortifications and tactical techniques have changed, both in defence and offence. All this requires serious practice. Now two countries in the world have such experience – we and Russia.
North Korea is not a technologically advanced country.
Biletskyi: If we talk about North Korea, it seems to me that the influence of the North Korean defence industrial base on our war is of an order of magnitude greater than anything that Korea can put on the battlefield.
What the North Koreans have supplied to the Russians is, give or take, the same amount of artillery ammunition that all NATO countries have given us in almost three years. This is a problem.
Yes, I know it is bad ammunition.
And yes, the Russians immediately identify that the artillery ammunition is Korean – it has a different coefficient. They understand that it is much less likely to hit the target, but it is still possible.
De commandant gaat ook nog verder in op motivatie en mobilisatie, voor mij wat interessante citaten eruit.
quote: Moraal bevorderend
A soldier needs to see that he has combat commanders, that there is a plan, and that his company commander was not just given a seven-word combat order to occupy a certain point by a certain date and given the coordinates.
A person must understand that for him to complete the task, a battalion or even a brigade also has to think. He sees that everything is being provided, he sees that he has an excellent level of medical care.
quote: Mobilisatie issues
Accordingly, if people understand that they will end up in a сombat training centre where they will not be engaged in combat training, where the number of rounds fired is a third, and sometimes less than the Soviet standard for a young soldier’s training, where they understand that then they will get the same incompetent sergeant who was simply pointed at and told he would be a sergeant, and this person will be his master over life and death – then this is not very motivating.
A person is primarily afraid of the unknown. When you realise that you have no experience on the battlefield, that you know nothing about it. Perhaps in two months they will tell you and explain everything, but you still have to go through those two months, and it's scary.
En de oplossing voor bovenstaande issue:
The answer is simple - teach. There is no other way. People become professionals only when they are taught.
Some have talent, while others have less. But anyone can be trained to be a solid enough average, competent enough to perform basic infantry tasks.
The issue of junior officer training needs to be solved urgently, and the approach to basic military training should be changed.
Hij denkt niet dat er een gebrek aan soldaten is, eerder dat ze niet goed zijn getraind. Als de eigen verliezen omlaag kunnen, en de Russische omhoog, dan is het mankracht probleem ook weer voor een deel opgelost.
The solution is to ensure that those people who join the army every month are trained many times better than they are now.
This means we will have fewer people absent without leave, fewer will be killed or injured, and Russian losses will increase.
Then the next month the critical shortage will be a little less and even less after that. This way, it [the army] will increase instead of decreasing indefinitely.
We need to dramatically increase the army's efficiency. Military efficiency primarily means high-quality combat training. We already have professional exercises to provide this training. They need to be scaled up.
How? They need people to train not hundreds, but thousands of instructors.
Ik heb lang niet alles eruit gehaald, dus zeker even het artikel lezen. Ik snap dat het wat meer is dan een tweet, maar een beetje diepgang zou hier geen kwaad kunnen.
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Yakolev op 26-11-2024 15:02
. Reden: typo ]
Well, sir, on first sighting the French, I naturally gave the order to advance. That's my style, sir.