Ik heb het volgende lapje tekst schaamteloos van reddit geplukt, Inc de vertaling. Sommigen zullen het al gelezen hebben, maar het leek me alsnog handig hier te vermelden.
Deze persoon zal wel bekend zijn hier, maakt heldere analyses zonder de roze bril visie die sommige anderen hebben.
Hij is hier niet al te positief over de situatie van Russische zijde. Sterker nog, bevestigd een aantal zaken die we al langere tijd horen, zoals de belabberde stand van zaken onder de mobiks.
An intersting Interview with Colone Andreas Schreiber. He is a military expert at the German Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, the Bundeswehr think tank. He works as a senior lecturer in military intelligence and cyber operations at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff Academy. Among other things, he served with the European military staff in Brussels, commanded a logistics battalion and was responsible for military intelligence on the staffs of the 13th Panzergrenadier Division and the 10th Panzer Division. Schreiber was also the liaison officer for the German armed forces in the Pentagon.
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The Ukrainian and Russian armed forces are engaged in heavy fighting in southern and eastern Ukraine. The current situation is explained by Colonel i. G. Andreas Schreiber in the RND interview and says: Before winter there will be even greater gains in territory and the Russian front in the east will not last much longer.
Mr. Schreiber, we have received conflicting reports from Cherson about a possible withdrawal of Russian troops. Is there a run from the Ukrainian army there?
In Cherson, Russian troops are retreating with great haste from the west bank. Until two weeks ago, the remnants of three to four armies and an army corps were stationed there. About 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers who were badly attritioned. With the few bridges rendered unusable, Russian forces face enormous challenges getting material and supplies across the Dnieper to Kherson. This also explains why Russia has to withdraw combative soldiers from the city.
I have the impression that an attempt is being made to evacuate the last of the personnel who are still able to fight while they can. At the same time, we see Russia sending newly recruited personnel to the Kherson region to allow these troops to safely withdraw. The aim is that there will be no collapses and evasive movements like in other parts of the front line.
Do you think it is realistic for Ukraine to recapture parts of Cherson by the end of the year?
Yes, it is quite realistic that parts of Cherson west of the Dnieper can be liberated. Actually, it's only a matter of time. Because Russia is less and less able to supply these troops and the Ukraine is specifically attacking the Russian ammunition and fuel depots. This would allow Ukraine to repulse Russian troops or destroy them on the spot without any major fighting. The Russians have evidently also recognized this danger.
Russia has already deported civilians from Cherson and emptied the city, so to speak. Is the decisive battle imminent there?
It doesn't necessarily have to end in a decisive battle. Possibly for the first time in this war we are seeing a coordinated Russian retreat from a position that is no longer tenable. So retreat instead of confrontation. In this way, Russia would avoid a tactical defeat and could bring a large part of the troops back across the Dnieper undamaged and use them to build up new units. However, all heavy equipment is lost because it can no longer be brought across the Dnieper. However, it will then take a relatively long time to replenish evacuated units - too long to hold the western bank of the Dnieper or to be able to deploy these troops again in the medium term
A few days ago we were still talking about a dam apparently mined by Russia, then about a "dirty bomb" whose alleged evidence turned out to be fake. How seriously do you have to take all this?
We cannot rule out anything at this time, neither the blowing up of the dam nor the triggering of a nuclear incident. I'm not thinking of a "dirty bomb" but rather of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. However, both would be of no use to the Russians tactically or operationally. If they blew up the dam, the tidal wave would primarily hit the Russian positions on the east bank of the Dnieper. Depending on the wind direction, a nuclear incident would also contaminate areas currently under Russian control. These scenarios affect not only the local population, but also the Russian troops deployed there. It is questionable whether Russia will take this risk.
And what about the strategy of taking such a step to keep the Russian troops in Kherson out of the public eye?
In fact, the Kremlin is now heavily on the defensive in declaring its military incompetence. Even more than in the last few months. It is therefore conceivable that actions such as blowing up the dam or a nuclear incident are carried out as an act of desperation. The result, however, would be global horror, and even in the Russian military blogger community such a case would not cause much enthusiasm or be seen as a Russian victory. The paradox is that one would devastate an area that was previously annexed and officially proclaimed as part of Russia. The damage would therefore be enormous, it would be a declaration of bankruptcy by the Russian military.
Actually, observers assumed a few weeks ago that Russia would run out of ammunition very soon. Was that just wishful thinking or was and still is something to it?
Basically, these reports have been around since the second month of the war. But we have to differentiate which ammunition we are talking about. Normal Russian artillery ammunition of caliber 122mm and 152mm is actually becoming scarcer. But Russian forces have by no means reached a point where they are running out of ammunition. The situation is different with the so-called precision ammunition. After the attacks on Kyiv about two weeks ago, the proportion of Russian precision ammunition that was used went down again very quickly.
Apparently, Russia doesn't have much of this munition left, so Iranian drones are now being used extensively. In contrast to Ukraine, Russia does not use the drones tactically at the front, but as a strategic terrorist weapon against civilian targets. So Russia is trying to keep up the pressure with cheaper means.
But Russia is not making any military advances with it. Are they trying to delay the war for as long as possible?
With purchased ammunition and hastily mobilized forces, Russia is trying to stabilize the current front line, even with high personnel losses. It is precisely among Russian military bloggers that there is a view that Kherson is, firstly, untenable and, secondly, operationally unimportant. Russia could withdraw from Kherson, thereby freeing up forces badly needed elsewhere. At the same time, Russia is trying to increase training capacities by having soldiers trained in Belarus. Many of our own trainers were deployed in the third or fourth month of the war and most of them died. In Belarus, training follows the same doctrine and in the same language, and Lukashenko may be able to buy his way out by having to send troops himself.
In September, Ukraine took the lead in retaking large parts of Kharkiv. Does she still have the initiative?
Ukraine remains in the forehand and we are still seeing successful attacks in the south. There, the Ukrainians are making slow but steady progress. There are also smaller successes of the Ukrainians in the north, east of Kharkiv. But the Russian attacks on the Donbass front continue. However, the progress is very small, only a few hundred meters a day, and there are epic losses. But the Russian troops have now been at a standstill for three or four days. The Russian associations have simply bled dry and can no longer. We are now back in a final phase of attrition and the next collapses are upon the Russians. Not within the next day or two, but probably within the next week or two.
Does that mean that you now expect Ukraine to gain even more ground before winter sets in?
In any case. We have often seen attacks by Ukraine after they have worn the Russians down to the point where they were barely able to resist. Ukraine's next major attack in Donbass could breach Russian defenses and lead to a collapse of the Russian front. I also believe that winter will not lead to a pause in fighting. Especially in the Donbass area, where the winter is very hard, there will be new tactical opportunities for attackers. There the rivers and lakes will freeze over, allowing first infantry and later combat vehicles to cross them. Even the currently softened soils become passable in frost and are suitable for quick advances.
From eastern Ukraine we also get pictures of a large-scale defensive wall that is said to be around 200 kilometers long. Is this line of fortifications a preparation for winter?
In my view, this line of fortifications, which the Russian mercenary group Wagner is building to attract public attention, is above all an attempt by Wagner boss Prigozhin to upgrade his own troops. But these forms of defenses have moral value at best. Ever since the dawn of mechanized warfare in World War II, we have known that such defenses are useless. You are doomed to fail. There is not enough time or material to build deeper fortifications, as the Ukrainians did in the Bakhmut and Kramatorsk areas. Eastern Ukraine is actually ideally suited for defense due to the many rivers and lakes. But the Ukrainians were still able to take large areas in a surprise attack in early September.
Russia has ordered a mobilization against the depleted forces, unleashing a large wave of Russian deserters fleeing military service. In the end, did the mobilization do Russia more harm than good?
We can already state that the conscription could not qualitatively compensate for the losses of the Russian armed forces. It is incredibly difficult for Russia to even provision and provision these new soldiers. They lack everything. Russia did not manage to train them. In Ukraine they are simply burned as cannon fodder at the front. And the Russian reservists know that.
In Russia it is said that the mistakes have been recognized and that they want to fix them. Do you think so?
The mistakes have certainly been recognized, but nothing will change. Even in the medium term, the Russian system will not be able to fix these errors independently. It's amazing that Russian recruits have to bring almost all their equipment with them. We had hitherto assumed that, at least in the large depots, there would be adequate quantities of uniforms, winter clothing, and simple arms; we are not even talking about highly developed devices. But obviously that is not the case.
Will another mobilization then be necessary for new cannon fodder?
Whether there will be another mobilization is difficult to estimate. It is clear, however, that a new wave of mobilization would be just as unlikely as the current one. We are now seeing that Russia does not even have sufficient capacity for the semi-annual drafting of new conscripts by October 1st and had to postpone this to November 1st. So how do you intend to carry out another mobilization? And the Russians now also know what is happening at the front, for example through friends and acquaintances who have been drafted and are now supposed to be fighting.
What other strategy could Russia adopt instead?
For the first time in this war, Russia would have to establish real focal points. It would only make sense for Russia to secure the approaches to Crimea. The Russian soldiers could give up the east bank of the Dnieper so far that they can still hold the Donbass in the first place. This would have withdrawn them to pre-February 24, 2022 territory. That's all Russia can hope for, and I suspect the fighting won't end well for the Russians in the end.