Tja je mag het niet leuk vinden. Helaas is het niet zo vreemd dat men er over begint. De geschiedkundige van het filmpje haalt an sich een goede
bron aan, alleen hij heeft hem niet goed gelezen. Men wijst hierin zelfs op het mogelijk inzetten van nucleaire wapens tegen NATO grondgebied (zie pagina 39).
Over inzet beperkt tot Oekraïne wordt ook nagedacht (dit is geschreven in juni, toen het nog 'beter' ging:)
Scott Sagan, a co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, at Stanford University, believes that the risk of Russia using a nuclear weapon has declined in the past month, as the fighting has shifted to southern Ukraine. Putin is unlikely to contaminate territory he’s hoping to seize with radioactive fallout. And a warning shot, such as the detonation of a nuclear weapon harmlessly over the Black Sea, would serve little purpose, Sagan says. It would signal irresolution, not resolve—a conclusion that the United States reached half a century ago about the potential utility of a NATO demonstration strike to deter the Red Army. Sagan concedes that if Russia were to lose major battles in the Donbas, or if a Ukrainian counteroffensive seemed on the verge of a great victory, Putin might well order the use of a nuclear weapon to obtain a surrender or a cease-fire. In response, depending on the amount of damage caused by the nuclear explosion, Sagan would advocate American conventional attacks on Russian forces in Ukraine, Russian ships in the Black Sea, or even military targets inside Russia, such as the base from which the nuclear strike was launched.
Sagan takes issue with how the back-and-forth of military conflict is commonly depicted. As an image, an escalation ladder seems too static. It suggests the freedom to decide whether you should go up or down. Sagan thinks nuclear escalation would be more like an escalator: Once it starts moving, it has a momentum of its own, and it’s really hard to get off. He would be deeply concerned by any sign that Putin is taking even the initial steps toward nuclear use. “We should not underestimate the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation if tactical weapons are removed from their storage igloos and dispersed widely among Russian military forces,” Sagan warns.
Er zijn ook zorgen over de Krim, Rusland ziet dat als zijn eigen grondgebied. Het veroveren daar van kan dan weer worden uitgelegd als een bedreiging voor het voortbestaan (zit ook een belangrijke militaire capaciteit aan vast). Daarnaast is er ook nog een logica die erop wijst dat Rusland zijn 'low yield' arsenaal nooit heeft afgebouwd en dat het gebruik daarvan op militaire doelen ophef zal veroorzaken die met een paar weken weer over waait (
Bill Perry).
In destructive power, the behemoths of the Cold War dwarfed the American atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Washington’s biggest test blast was 1,000 times as large. Moscow’s was 3,000 times. On both sides, the idea was to deter strikes with threats of vast retaliation — with mutual assured destruction, or MAD. The psychological bar was so high that nuclear strikes came to be seen as unthinkable.
Today, both Russia and the United States have nuclear arms that are much less destructive — their power just fractions of the Hiroshima bomb’s force, their use perhaps less frightening and more thinkable.
...
Analysts note that Russian troops have long practiced the transition from conventional to nuclear war, especially as a way to gain the upper hand after battlefield losses. And the military, they add, wielding the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, has explored a variety of escalatory options that Mr. Putin might choose from.
Concern about these smaller arms has soared as Vladimir V. Putin, in the Ukraine war, has warned of his nuclear might, has put his atomic forces on alert and has had his military carry out risky attacks on nuclear power plants. The fear is that if Mr. Putin feels cornered in the conflict, he might choose to detonate one of his lesser nuclear arms — breaking the taboo set 76 years ago after Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Verder is er een '
Tiger Team' die 3x per week bekijkt hoe navo gaat reageren op het gebruik van chemische, biologische en/of nucleaire wapens in Ukraine. Dat is het team dat heeft bedacht dat NATO nu 300.000 troepen in de grenslanden gaat plaatsen (hadden ze beter eerder kunnen bedenken, vóór de invasie maar goed dat is een andere discussie).
Eigenlijk zie je aan alle kanten dat er rekening gehouden wordt met escalatie:
Senator Angus King of Maine, an independent and a member of the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, visited the Polish-Ukrainian border over the weekend, meeting with officials from allied countries, visiting a refugee processing center and talking with Ukrainians. Mr. King said that as Russian forces struggle to make headway, Mr. Putin could try to strike a diplomatic agreement, intensify his bombardment of Ukrainian cities and level them, or lash out against the West with a cyberattack.
“The fourth is escalate to de-escalate, which is a tactical nuclear weapon,” Mr. King said, using the term for a Russian military doctrine in which it would employ a nuclear weapon as a warning — and then negotiate
Stuk van The Atlantic is wat dat betreft wel aardig:
As I listened to the recording of my conversation with Bill Perry, it was filled with the incongruous sounds of wind chimes and birds singing. Vladimir Putin can determine if, when, and where a nuclear attack occurs in Ukraine. But he cannot control what happens after that. The consequences of that choice, the series of events that would soon unfold, are unknowable. ...One thing is clear, after all my discussions with experts in the field: We must be ready for hard decisions, with uncertain outcomes, that nobody should ever have to make.
TLDR: Toepassing van nucleaire wapens is iets waar momenteel rekening mee wordt gehouden en dat zeker niet is uitgesloten.
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