De Russische Mobilisatie
En dan is die mobilisatie alweer... "voorbij". Gisteren werd dit tenminste aangekondigd door Poetin. Het aantal van 300.000 vereiste troepen was bereikt (
19). Vanaf het ontstaan van het
De situatie binnen Rusland topic wilde ik al een stuk doen over die Russische mobilisatie. Eindelijk heb ik daar nu tijd voor gevonden. In voorbereiding heb ik verschillende analyses gelezen. Omdat dit al een verhaal met een buik is heb ik enkele aspecten erbuiten laten vallen. Zoals hoe bouwde Rusland zijn leger in het verleden op, en hoe beïnvloeden training en beschikbaarheid van uitrusting de effectiviteit van deze mobilisatie. Heel essentieel, maar ook onderwerpen die een aparte behandeling verdienen.
Doelstelling
De formele lezing van die doelstelling is af te leiden uit de verklaring van Poetin zelf.
Verklaring Poetin
Uittreksel van die verklaring (
1)
Today our armed forces . . . are fighting on the line of contact that is over 1,000 kilometers long, fighting not only against neo-Nazi units but actually the entire military machine of the collective West. . . . I find it necessary to support the proposal of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff on partial mobilization in the Russian Federation to defend our Motherland and its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to ensure the safety of our people and people in the liberated territories. . . . Only military reservists, primarily those who served in the armed forces and have specific military occupational specialties and corresponding experience, will be called up. Before being sent to their units, those called up for active duty will undergo mandatory additional military training based on the experience of the special military operation.
Zie voor een volledige tekst (
2).
Interessant is wel dat de formele uitgangspunten van die Russische mobilisatie niet zo veel anders zijn dan die bij de Amerikaanse gedeeltelijke mobilisaties (
2,
3):
This action is roughly equivalent to U.S. partial mobilization. The United States has used that authority many times in the past for Desert Storm and for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for smaller operations.
Voorbij die formele façade lijkt echter alles bijna anders. Hierover meer verderop. Over de doelstelling gaan trouwens de meningen van de gelezen bronnen al uiteen. Vast staat wel dat de mobilisatie het urgente tekort aan Russische soldaten moet lenigen(
2,
3):
A number of military experts in the West and Ukraine say Mr. Putin's decision to call up reservists shows that Russian troops are failing badly on the battlefield in Ukraine - more than seven months after Moscow launched its invasion.
De doelstelling kan zich beperken tot het neutraliseren van de verliezen(
1,
2,
5):
The decree implementing partial mobilization adds what is called “stop loss.” (
2) Personnel will remain on active duty involuntarily until the end of partial mobilization. This is a sensible step when militaries face personnel shortages and large-scale military operations, as the personnel retained are already in units and trained. However, in the United States, “stop loss” proved to be controversial when implemented during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Critics called it a “backdoor draft.”.
Volgens (
1) lijkt trouwens de doelstelling van Rusland met de mobilisatie eerder een politieke dan een militaire:
It is unlikely that the Russian generals believe this mobilization will shift the initiative and allow Russia to launch major attacks. Ukrainian forces are getting too powerful with foreign equipment and training. Rather, the strategy is likely to hold on to what Russia has already captured and push the war into the winter. Putin aims to put the European populations under enough stress from the cold, inflation, and high energy prices that they demand an end to the war. Survey data indicates that the European populations support Ukraine in its fight for democracy but are ambivalent about providing weapons and becoming involved. (The Baltic countries and Poland are an exception, being on the front line and much more concerned about Russian intentions.) Thus, Europeans might force their governments to push for a cease-fire and negotiations.
Tenslotte verwacht (
6) niet dat de gemobiliseerde troepen de bestaande troepen aanvullen maar meer vervangen. Tegelijk stelt (
6) dat we niet moeten verwachten dat het hiervoor bij Rusland stopt:
The next wave Putin sends to the front lines may include soldiers who have received more training. They will likely take the place of units that have been fighting in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion in February. The Russian command has so far been reluctant to permit rotations – because it (rightly) believed that after returning to Russia the soldiers would attempt to leave the army. Russia will need all the officially announced 300,000 troops to fulfil this task. But it would be naive to think that the Kremlin’s plans are limited only to maintaining the occupied territories.
Voor dat laatste stelt (
6) iets voor mij opmerkelijks(
6,
17):
Furthermore, the Kremlin is unlikely to have given up on taking Kyiv and forcing regime change, which could indeed be a key goal of Putin’s mobilisation. Ukraine has drafted around a million people to fight, but the entire Russian contingent amounts to just 250,000 (that is, if it has managed to compensate for its significant losses(
17)). Moscow may therefore be trying to establish at least parity in manpower before it attempts to take more territory.
Het moment, de timing
Ten eerste was de mobilisatie al voor de aankondiging op 21 September begonnen (
8):
During a televised interview on Wednesday (Sep 21,2022), Shoigu said Russia would be targeting 300,000 draftees, mainly those with recent military experience. But the actual number in an order signed by Putin is secret.
One woman said a 52-year-old relative had been delivered a povestka shortly before the president announced the draft the previous day.
Eigenlijk is die mobilisatie voor Rusland al te laat (
9). Voor een optimaal effect op de strijd had ze een maand of drie eerder moeten zijn geweest:
Russia’s attacks in the Donbas region petered out in July having gained some territory, though at high cost. The Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun. In the southwest, the Ukrainians are currently attacking toward Kherson and though they have not taken much territory, they are putting the Russians under considerable pressure. Russian forces are vulnerable, occupying a large bridgehead on the west side of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian precision strikes are squeezing Russian logistics.
In the northeast, the Ukrainian counteroffensive gained much territory east of Kharkiv, though progress has slowed. The Russian generals likely told Putin that they could not hold their gains without additional troops.
Poetin heeft lang gedraald met die mobilisatie, maar alternatieven had hij eigenlijk niet (
9):
Putin did have two other options: use nuclear weapons or negotiate a settlement. The commentariat has speculated endlessly about the use of nuclear weapons. Such use would risk Russian national survival for a sliver of Ukrainian territory. So far, Russia has limited nuclear threats to NATO direct intervention or Ukrainian movement into the Russian homeland.
A negotiated settlement is not possible currently because the two sides are so far apart. Putin cannot give up his conquests without endangering his regime, but Ukraine insists that Russia evacuate all occupied territory, including Crimea.
Hoeveel tijd voor enig effect?
Volgens (
7) was het niet te verwachten dat de nieuwe troepen maanden de kans krijgen om zich voor te bereiden, met alle consequenties van dien:
The high-readiness section of Russia’s reserve system has been exploited to generate the initial force that invaded Ukraine; this force is therefore unlikely to provide a rapid change to the war. The massed mobilization will take some time, although it is unlikely that the Russian armed forces will be allowed the months that they would require to turn this force into something truly useful. Instead, Russia’s history of rushing forces into combat is likely to gain a new grizzly chapter as former servicemen are pushed into Ukraine in the coming weeks.
Omvang
De omvang van de mobilisatie is de lastigst te beantwoorden vraag. Hierbij moeten we afgaan op wat we aan informatie uit Rusland krijgen. Zo komt (
8) met de volgende informatie:
The first full day of Russia’s first mobilisation since the second world war (
12) produced emotional showdowns at draft centers and even signs of protest (
13), while it appears Russia could be considering far more than the 300,000 new conscripts claimed by the defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.
In a community of 450 people, the village head was walking from house to house, seeking to hand out more than 20 draft notices. In the past day, she said, she and her colleagues had received and identified more than 3,000 reports of povestka, or draft papers, being delivered in Buryatia within just 24 hours of Vladimir Putin announcing the draft.
Het lijkt dat departementen verplicht worden tot het leveren van een quotum aan troepen
“I understand that we have a quota. Our republic needs to gather 4,000 soldiers,” said Nimayeva in a video addressed to the regional governor. “But some parameters and principles of this partial mobilization must be observed.”
Desondanks zegt het bovenstaande nog niet alles. Als ook waar is dat bepaalde gemeenschappen bovengemiddeld worden geraakt kan dit beeld nog niet makkelijk in een aantal worden vertaald.
Bovengrens voor die Mobilisatie
Vanuit de behoefte denkend kan wel een bovengrens voor de mobilisatie worden bedacht. Het aantal militairen dat Oekraïne maximaal in het veld zou kunnen brengen is rond de miljoen. Eigenlijk delen alle bronnen die ik heb gecheckt dit gegeven wel (
8):
Some think it could be far higher. The independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that a source in the presidential administration said Russia was seeking to draft more than 1 million people into the army.
Maar ook (
9) noemt een dergelijk getal, afgeleid van (
10). Beide bronnen noemen Russische bloggers als bron:
Some Russian bloggers have claimed that the number could be 1 million. All these numbers are speculative. Russia’s ability to induct, train, equip, and move troops to the front is limited. This mobilization will be a stream, not a surge.
Ook (
4) noemt het getal van een miljoen als maximum en wijst op extra alertheid doordat het benodigd aantal reservisten een geclassificeerd gegeven was:
However, reports in opposition Russian media suggested that up to one million people could be called up, pointing out that one paragraph believed to be about the exact number of the required reservists was omitted (classified) in the published version of Mr Putin's decree on the official Kremlin website
In his announcement about the mobilization last week, Mr Putin did not specify how many reservists would be called up.
But speaking immediately after the president, Mr Shoigu said 300,000 reservists - people who have had military experience and required specialist skills - would be enlisted.
Tenslotte brengt ook (
6) een gedeeltelijke mobilisatie in twijfel, en refereert hierbij aan (
11) en weer (
8):
Several media outlets (
11), meanwhile, have reported that Russia in fact plans to draft a million soldiers – and not only from reserves (
8). This has raised credible doubts about the ‘partial’ nature of the Kremlin’s mobilization. The Ukrainian armed forces therefore need to prepare for a large influx of Russian troops arriving in Ukraine over the next few months.
Wie wordt opgeroepen?
Te oude mensen, geen militaire ervaring, invaliden (
4,
6):
One woman said a 52-year-old relative had been delivered a povestka shortly before the president announced the draft the previous day
Multiple reports say people with no military experience - or who are too old or disabled - are being called up
Mensen die weerstand bieden aan de Russische overheid (
1):
In Moscow, hundreds gathered to protest on downtown Arbat Street after Putin announced the mobilisation. Police officers reportedly began giving draft notices to those they detained at the protest
Gevangenen (
8):
In a phone call with journalists, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to confirm that police were handing down draft notices to detainees. “It does not violate the law,” he said
Studenten (
8):
In Buryatia, activists said they didn’t understand why local officials were recruiting so aggressively, with students at local universities receiving draft notices while they were sitting in class
Ethnische minderheden (
8,
15):
Many are in Russia’s ethnic minority republics, reinforcing a sense that the country has been disproportionately relying on ethnic minorities to provide its main fighting force in Ukraine. Those regions have also suffered a disproportionate number of deaths and casualties from the war
Yanina Nimayeva, a journalist from Ulan-Ude in Buryatia, complained that her 38-year-old husband had received a draft notice despite never having served in the army.
In Neryungri, the second largest town in Sakha, also known as Yakutia, video footage appeared to show dozens of men being gathered at the Gornyak football stadium and loaded on to buses bound for recruitment centres, as family members bid tearful farewells. Many of the men appeared to be in their 30s and 40s.
“They’ve already given out draft notices to workers from Kolmar and Mechel” (two large mining companies with operations in the region), said the activist who posted the video. “They were giving out draft notices all night.”
In Dagestan, a video appeared to show people angrily confronting an official arguing in favour of the draft at a recruitment centre.
The official said that her son had been fighting in Ukraine since February.
“You’re fighting for your children’s future,” shouted the woman, who was not identified, in front of a crowd outside a municipal building.
“We don’t have a present, what kind of future are you talking about?” a man in the crowd responded.
Dat ethnische minderheden bovengemiddeld zijn vertegenwoordigd in mobilisatie lijsten kan te maken hebben met dat ze vaak voldoen aan de criteria die Rusland stelt aan de mensen die het zoekt (
7):
The specific conditions set forth in Putin’s decree cover those with former military experience, especially in desired areas such as drivers, gunners, and artillerymen. It established clear grounds for those that would not be involved in the mobilization, as well as the vague promise of quotas per region. It is worth noting that the decree is likely to disproportionately affect Russia’s poorer regions. The Russian armed forces are seen as one of the primary careers for young men from Dagestan, for example. This means that there will be more people in Dagestan liable for mobilization than will be the case in other more affluent areas of Russia.
Weerstand in Rusland
Deze mobilisatie ging niet zonder weerstand, want veel draagvlak heeft de
Speciale Militaire Operatie niet. Laat staan dat mannen ervoor willen gaan vechten (
4):
Since the mobilization announcement, more than 2,000 people have been detained at protests across Russia.
"There are cases when the decree is violated," Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman said, adding that "all the errors will be corrected". He said that in some regions, "governors are actively working to rectify the situation".
Over the weekend, people in Russia's Dagestan republic in the North Caucasus clashed with police over the mobilisation drive. More than 100 people were arrested during protests in the regional capital, Makhachkala, said OVD-Info, an independent Russian human rights monitor.
There have also been reports of a number of arson attacks on recruitment centres and other administrative buildings across Russia.
Enkele dagen later probeert Poetin de gemoederen wat te bedaren door bijvoorbeeld de studenten van mobilisatie uit te sluiten (
4):
On 24 September, Mr Putin issued a new decree specifically stating that students would be deferred from the draft
Wanneer met een scheef oog naar Amerikaanse mobilisaties (1991) wordt gekeken (
1) dan blijkt dat een plotselinge mobilisatie een uitdaging is voor een bureaucratie. Ook bij de Amerikanen traden in eerste instantie problemen op die dan later opgelost raakten. Bijzonder bij de Russen is de vraag hoe plotseling deze mobilisatie echt was, of ze niet toch al achter de coulissen kan voorbereid zijn geweest.
Het eerder genoemde systeem van quota per departement werkt misbruik in de hand. De doelen zijn bij de lokale autoriteiten gelegd, waardoor het risico ontstaat dat vooral de focus wordt gelegd op het halen van een quotum, ongeacht de middelen.
Initial Reports Indicate Mobilization Is Going Badly
(
1)
The bureaucracy appears unready to handle the demands of such a complex effort. Personnel must be identified, notified, medically evaluated, administratively brought onto active duty, and then sent to a training establishment. During this administrative period, personnel must be fed and housed. The United States suffered problems with its mobilization mechanisms in 1991, the first large mobilization since World War II, but worked out procedures over time. The Russians may have the same experience.
Like many bureaucratic tasks in Russia, mobilization is being conducted using quotas levied on districts. The quota system decentralizes and simplifies execution but incentivizes local authorities to prioritize output at any cost. This can create abuses.
In addition to bureaucratic problems, security forces seem to be threatening demonstrators with mobilization, contrary to the announced policy
Ofschoon we van de Russische oppositie momenteel niet de wereld mogen verwachten kan de weerstand tegen de mobilisatie wel de oppositie de wind in de zeilen geven (
1).
The Wild Card Is Political Opposition
Domestic opposition arose at the beginning of the war, with antiwar demonstrations in many cities. However, the Russian security forces successfully suppressed these demonstrations. The government-controlled media dominated the information space, convincing most Russians that the war was defensive and intended to suppress a neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine. Overall, the war seems to be popular with the average Russian. However, mobilization involves more Russian families in the war and has induced fears among many men that they might be called up. Opposition seems to be widespread. However, it remains to be seen whether this opposition will have an operational effect on the war or if it will peter out as earlier antiwar efforts did
Effect – Consequenties
Al die mobilisatie enig effect resulteren? De inschatting van (
7) is dat ze op zijn best stabiliserend kan werken op de linies bij een verdedigende oorlog:
With many Russian units in Ukraine between 50% and 70% strength, the most immediate effect of mobilisation will be to create a large number of poorly trained replacements to shore up the numbers. Today, their guns are suppressed because of the threat to their ammunition from GMLRS, and so this immediate topping-up of units will not produce significant offensive capabilities. It will, however, likely help to stabilise defensive lines, increasing the level of resources Kyiv must commit to achieve breakthroughs. Nevertheless, throwing unwilling and under-trained replacements into already-demoralised units at the onset of winter is unlikely to change the direction of fighting on the ground.
Op langere termijn bestaat een risico dat door Rusland nieuwe eenheden kunnen worden opgericht, uitgerust en getraind. Dit gaat maanden duren en die eenheden komen druppelsgewijs beschikbaar. Mogelijk is dit voor Oekraïne beheersbaar:
Much more dangerous for Ukraine is the prospect of Russia forming new formations out of their mobilised recruits. To take new recruits, turn them into units with a basic level of training, refurbish old equipment and distribute it, and create the command and control for any sort of offensive manoeuvres will take months. It will be hampered by Russia having already deployed many of its instructors for various military specialisms to Ukraine, and the fact that Russian recruits usually complete their training in their units, which are now deployed. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect new formations to be formed for February.
Initial formations are likely to be equipped with an assortment of older weaponry. Russian industry is still reeling to service existing fleets. Over time, however, if the Russian government manages its industry competently, it will consolidate its efforts on a limited number of systems and begin to stabilise supply. It is also possible that Iran and China – some equipment from both countries is already in use in Ukraine – may help to equip new formations from the spring.
Veel soldaten met relatief minder uitrusting kan nog steeds een resultaat opleveren, als die dan maar ervaren zijn (
7):
The history of infantry-heavy formations conducting offensives against modern, mechanised troops demonstrates that they can deliver results. The best example is China’s driving back US forces in Korea during its initial offensive. There, however, Chinese forces were made up of highly experienced and motivated veterans of the People’s Liberation Army. And they still took massive casualties. The prospects for Russia’s new formations against Ukrainian troops is less promising, so long as Ukraine has the ammunition and reserves to deal with the numbers. Men against metal is usually a poor bet.
Russen verlaten het land
Volgens (
4) zou de impact van de mobilisatie op de economie nog wel meevallen (
1,
15):
Some have speculated that this will severely disrupt the Russian economy, but that is unlikely. Even if 300,000 troops are mobilized, that represents only .4 percent of the Russian labor force
.
Tellen we hierbij de Russen op die het land sinds de aanvang van de mobilisatie hebben ontvlucht (
4):
Mr Peskov also said he was unaware of any decisions to shut Russia's borders and impose martial law in the country. Media reports earlier suggested this could be done to stop potential recruits escaping abroad. Since the mobilisation was announced, many young Russians have been seeking to leave the country. Satellite images show lengthy queues of Russian cars on the border with Georgia
.
...dan kan hiervoor volgens (
16) een getal van 700.000 worden genoemd. In dat geval zou in totaal 1.3% van de beroepsbevolking wegvallen. Van de ontvluchtte groep kan je verwachten dat ze meer impact vertegenwoordigd, omdat ze tot de intellectuele bovenklasse zal behoren.
Desondanks limiteert Rusland zich met haar
Speciale Militaire Operatie. Ze kan geen (...weinig) dienstplichtigen gebruiken. Bovendien is het Russische leger totaal niet georiënteerd op het uitvoeren van offensieve operatie. Grozny, Afganistan zijn hiervan eerdere getuigenissen.
Russia Is Struggling to Turn Potential Power into Actual Power
(
1):
From the beginning of the conflict, commentators have pointed out that the Russian population is over three times the size of Ukraine’s (146 million versus 41 million), with larger armed forces and a much larger economy. In theory, it should prevail in a long war of attrition. Russia’s problem has been turning potential power into battlefield capabilities. Putin has described the conflict as a “special military operation” and not a war. That limited his powers. For example, the Russian military has not been able to use many conscripts, even though they constitute the major part of the ground forces. Partial mobilization will tap into some of this potential power. Ukraine, in contrast, has been able to access all the elements of its national power
As Russia analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee point out, the Russian army is structured to defend the homeland against invasion, not to invade a neighboring country (
16) Thus, units were typically at about 70 percent personnel strength and had a lot of conscripts who could not deploy outside of Russia proper. For defense of the homeland, reserve call-up would fill the ranks. For a special military operation, where mobilization authorities were limited, there were just not enough troops to deploy. This is a very different military from that of the United States, which is structured for high readiness and rapid deployment outside the country
En hoe verder, en waar nu op te letten?
Waar we de vinger goed op moeten gaan houden is wat de oppositie in Rusland aan het doen is. Van de week waren er alweer nieuwe berichten van sabotage acties. Een belangrijke indicator is of we dat in frequentie zien toenemen.
Vandaag heeft Poetin aangekondigd dat de mobilisatie is voltooid en dat het aantal van 300.000 nieuwe soldaten was bereikt (
19). Dat hierbij 82.000 militairen al in actie zijn gekomen is een veeg teken voor hun training.
Deze beëindiging kwam op mij schielijk over. Vragen die bij mij opkwamen waren: “is dit wel echt zo, of alleen het managen van westerse verwachtingen?” en: “zouden binnenlandse toestanden tot deze plotselinge beëindiging hebben geleid?
Hieronder daarom nog even kort waarop te letten de komende tijd. Zowel (
1) als (
6) benadrukten al het belang om die oppositie in de gaten te houden. Zoals (
6) ook aangeeft, gaat het Poetin er vooral om dat de mobilisatie een succes wordt, ongeacht wat. Bij dit laatste kunnen we van alles invullen, wat we maar even niet doen:
What to Watch for
(
1):
Several indicators are worth monitoring to see how this mobilization plays out. First, does domestic opposition interfere with the mobilization? From a military point of view, the key question is whether such opposition significantly reduces the number of personnel available for mobilization. Can Russian forces hold out until the mobilized personnel start arriving? Although the front lines seem to have stabilized, the Russian position is fragile. It could crack in the weeks before mobilized personnel arrive. Can Russia train and equip these forces? Although the standards do not need to rise to the U.S. expectations, they do need to achieve a minimum level for personnel to be effective. Finally, does Russian morale maintain at least a minimum level? Russian morale has not been high, but the Russians keep fighting. A thousand years of history indicate that the Russians can continue fighting in conditions other nations might not tolerate.
(
6):
The Kremlin’s mobilisation should signal to Ukraine and its partners that Russia is playing all its cards, even those that could endanger the stability of the Putin regime. After all, Putin held off mobilising for many months, believing he could conduct a successful military campaign for the TV cameras without any losses. But few Russians are eager to sacrifice their lives for what they perceive as a TV show – as the wave of protests across the country and the exodus of around 200,000 men from Russia attest.
(
6):
This mobilisation is therefore a sign of the regime’s weakness, not a demonstration of strength. And its main aim may be to discourage the West from further arming Ukraine. The Kremlin is doing this by making nuclear threats and trying to convince Ukraine’s allies that the war will drag on for years, placing their economies under intolerable strain. It is important to see these manipulations for what they are: attempts to scare Europe into making concessions and slowing down its support for Ukraine. But if Putin is successful in this, European leaders will only end up serving his interests and goals. It is crucial that the Ukrainian armed forces can continue their counteroffensive and are prepared for larger numbers of Russian troops arriving at the front line. Ukraine already has sufficient numbers of well-qualified, highly motivated soldiers. These soldiers now need weapons to defend and take back their territories, and win the war.
Dat de mobilisatie nu zo plots tot een eind lijkt te komen geeft mij de impressie dat dit meer een signaal is dan een feitelijk gegeven. Misschien kunnen we het beste dit signaal vooralsnog naast ons neerleggen en vooral kijken naar andere informatie die uit Rusland komt.
Ofschoon veel van de bronnen stammen uit de eerste dagen van de mobilisatie blijven veel van hun analyses door gebrek aan meer en betere informatie nog staan. En met die analyses hun waarschuwingen die eigenlijk als volgt zijn samen te vatten:
Wantrouw wat er gezegd wordt en kijk vooral wat er gebeurt.
Bronnen
- September 26, 2022 - https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean
- September 21, 2022 - https://www.politico.eu/article/text-vladimir-putin-mobilization-decree-war-ukraine-russia/
- October 27, 2022 - https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section12302&num=0&edition=prelim
- September 26, 2022 - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63036985
- March 28, 2008 - https://www.npr.org/2008/03/28/89176560/is-the-u-s-army-operating-a-back-door-draft
- October 4, 2022 - https://ecfr.eu/article/no-partial-measures-how-ukraine-can-meet-the-challenge-of-russias-mobilisation/
- September 28, 2022 - https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/understanding-russias-mobilisation
- September 22, 2022 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-mobilisation-ukraine-war-army-drive
- September 21, 2022 - https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/putin-speech-annexation-ukraine-russia/
- September 22, 2022 - https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-denies-that-mobilisation-decree-allows-million-be-enlisted-2022-09-22/
- September 22, 2022 - https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/novaya-gazeta-russian-government-plans-to-mobilize-1-million-people-against-ukraine
- September 21, 2022 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/putin-announces-partial-mobilisation-in-russia-in-escalation-of-ukraine-war
- September 22, 2022 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-protests-more-than-1300-arrested-at-anti-war-demonstrations-ukraine
- March 30, 2022 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/coffins-in-buryatia-ukraine-invasion-takes-toll-on-russias-remote-regions
- February 8, 2022 - https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN?locations=RU
- June 2, 2022 - https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/
- September 13, 2022 - https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/putin-russia-military-spent-ukraine/
- October 6, 2022 - https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/where-have-russians-been-fleeing-since-mobilisation-began-2022-10-06/
- October 28, 2022 - https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/live-zelensky-vier-miljoen-oekrainers-zitten-zonder-stroom-vs-beloven-oekraine-nog-eens-275-miljoen-dollar-aan-militaire-steun~b4c1db9a/
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