Op de trage maat van de economische base drum gaat de vertraagde film van de neergang van de Russische economie ondertussen verder. Is dat dan reden voor een post? Op zichzelf niet, de neergang in de Russische economie is immers een constante.
Dat Rusland nu het punt van stagflatie benaderd, en dat dit wordt onderkend door de CEO van een van Ruslands’ grootste banken, de Sberbank, is wel een reden. Deze man, German Gref, behoort, of behoorde, tot de inner circle van Poetin.
(Reuters):
Gref is a long-term associate of Putin and drafted the president's first economic strategy in the early 2000s.
Wat zei Gref precies?
(Euronews):
The head of Russia's largest bank has said the country's economy has reached a stage of "technical stagnation." Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in the Russian city of Vladivostok, German Gref, who runs Sberbank, said that Russia would have to slash interest rates to avoid a recession.
En:
GDP data from July and August showed "quite clear symptoms that we are approaching zero," after figures from the second quarter of the year revealed signs of economic stagnation, Gref noted.
Om die reden ging die rente maar weer wat omlaag:
As the significant cost of Russia's war against Ukraine was sparking inflation, Russia's central bank increased interest rates to 21% in October. It subsequently lowered them, with the current rate standing at 18%.
Maar Gref wil die rentevoet nog lager hebben:
Gref, who is one of Russia's top bankers, said that dropping the key interest rate was needed "to revitalise the economy." "According to our estimates, which we are using internally for the end of the year, the rate will be around 14%," Gref said. "Is this enough for the economy to start to revive? In our opinion, not enough, and at current inflation levels, the rate at which we can hope to revitalise the economy is 12% or lower," he added.
Een ander valt hem hierin bij:
With a slowdown in lending visible in all segments of the Russian market, Alexander Shokhin, the president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggested that the key rate must be lowered to 16%. According to him, "10-12% is an acceptable rate for the economy for the next year, if not the optimal rate."
Met die “approaching zero” heeft Gref het over een stagflatie. Dat is geen goed nieuws voor Rusland, want dat rentepercentage stond in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar juist bewust zo hoog. Die 21% was bedoeld om een te hoge inflatie af te remmen:
In April (
teacup in "De situatie binnen Rusland") had het Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) het als volgt uitgesproken:
In April, the CMASF warned there was an increased possibility of "depositor flight" or a run on the banks. This was caused in part by the prospect of an economic downturn due to Russia's Central Bank setting a key interest rate of 21 percent to curb inflation of 10.2 percent amid warnings this will stifle lending and investment.
Die rente en inflatie is als volgt veranderd geweest (wat meetpuntjes uit dit topic):
Nu zijn Russen goed getraind tegen economische tegenwind, kijk maar eens naar
Requiem19 in "De situatie binnen Rusland" voor wat historische context.
Hieronder nog een uitgezoomd grafiekje van de bron in de @
YakuzA post om wat context over de inflatie van de laatste tien jaar te bieden:
In de Russische stagflatie worden in het westen door denktanks meteen kansen gezien:
The ‘Fortress Russia’ economy has adapted well to pressure. But stagflation presents an opportunity for the West
chathamhouse.orgThe Russian economy has proven much more durable through three and half years of full-scale war in Ukraine, and a decade of Western sanctions, than many would have expected.
Toch waren het Russische economische beleid en de sancties niet zonder kosten:
I estimate that real GDP growth has been around 1 per cent lower per annum for Russia over the past decade, at least, as a result of Putin’s policy settings. As a result, by 2025, real GDP is around 12 per cent lower than what it might have been.
Bovendien hebben de Russische centrale bank en de oligarchen 400 Miljard kwijtgeraakt op westerse bankrekeningen en is er nog een kapitaalvlucht geweest van enkele honderd miljard extra. Daar komt nog bij dat Rusland 100 Miljard extra aan defensie-uitgaven heeft gehad.
We zijn er alleen nog niet:
Whatever the scale of the economic losses, they have not been enough to encourage an about turn by Putin, or a decisive turn in domestic sentiment against the war. The power of propaganda and Putin’s control of the domestic media cannot be under-estimated.
Maar het wordt steeds moeilijker in Rusland:
However, the buffers Putin deployed before the war are beginning to be worn down. And there is much to suggest that the Russian macro-outlook is turning more challenging.
Inflation has consistently run at more than double the CBR’s 4 per cent inflation target since the full-scale invasion, as a result of sanctions boosting import costs, and rouble weakness. Inflation eats away at real standards of living, hitting the poorest hardest, who often bear the largest human cost of the war and more often than not are located in Russia’s regions.
Zo komt Rusland in een situatie met hoge inflatie en hele lage groei:
The CBR responded by hiking its main policy rate in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion to 21 per cent, the highest amongst its emerging market peers. The real economy is now struggling. Household and corporate lending has moderated sharply – the former to a near standstill. Economic activity has slowed too. Real GDP growth slowed to just 1.1 per cent YOY in the second quarter of 2025, after growing 1.4 per cent YOY in the first quarter, and less than one quarter the year earlier level.
Services and manufacturing PMIs have also dropped sharpy and are now in contractionary territory. Full year real GDP growth forecasts are being revised down to less than 1 per cent for 2025, but inflation expectations remain elevated. That suggests there is no end in sight for the current stagflationary macro situation.
Chatham House hamert daarom juist nu op sancties, en het strikt uitvoeren ervan:
- The West should begin by more strictly enforcing the existing sanctions regime, imposing greater secondary sanctions on countries, companies and individuals helping Russia. Much has been made of a proposal by the US Senate to levy 500 per cent tariffs on those importing Russian energy and commodities, But this is impracticable, as it would destabilize global markets.
- However, a 10-20 per cent across the board tariff on Russian exports could be effective and workable. Its merit would be increased if the monies raised were allocated to Ukraine’s defence.
- Finally, seizing the more than $300 billion in CBR assets immobilized in Western jurisdictions and allocating them to Ukraine’s defence would send a strong signal that there will be little light at the end of the tunnel for the Russian economy.