Tens schreef op zondag 11 augustus 2024 @ 18:36:
Even samengevat: het 272 motorized wat lag bij Kyslivka stond op de lijst voor een rotatie aan het front bij Donetsk richting Pokrovsk moest in plaats daarvan richting Kursk. Nog geen bevestiging van de werkelijke aanval op het transport btw.:
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hm, dezelfde claim over dit transport:
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kan 272 rifle regiment zo snel niet vinden. Edit: Kyslivka volgens Deepstate, betrekkelijk rustig gebied
Goede reminder die ik ook even elders zal posten (i.v.m. omgaan (des)informatie):
Since there have been numerous articles and statements on Telegram channels about the movement of Russian and Ukrainian reinforcements to the frontline, specifically the Kursk area, I think it's important to address a few points:
- Both Russian and Ukrainian forces face the same issue: battalions are often pulled from their brigades to reinforce weaker sections of the frontline. This means that when people hear "a brigade has moved," it might actually refer to only one or two battalions.
- We are now at a stage in the war where battalions can be essentially reinforced companies due to shortages of manpower and vehicles. This applies to both sides, as both Russia and Ukraine have created many new units and rapidly expanded their structures but lack enough personnel to fully staff existing units.
- Many OSINT analysts (this is not a criticism, just noting the limitations) often use FPV drone footage to identify the presence of specific units. For example, if X brigade posts a drone video from the Kherson area, it might be concluded that X brigade is operating there. However, native UAV units can be deployed separately for specific operations due to their mobility and effectiveness. Additionally, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have used this for disinformation, deliberately uploading videos from different locations with their logos to confuse the enemy.
Overall, when you read statements like "Another Ukrainian brigade has been spotted in Kursk" or "A Russian regiment from Krynky is heading to Kursk," it could mean anything from a company-sized battalion moving to a full brigade with thousands of personnel and dozens or even hundreds of vehicles.
Plus:
“Russia has shifted troops from the Kharkiv front, but so far it has moved far fewer from the vital Donbas front. ‘Their commanders aren’t idiots,’ says the Ukrainian general-staff source. ‘They are moving forces, but not as quickly as we would like. They know we can’t extend logistics 80 or 100 km.’”
Nog een andere PoV, Twitter waslijst die twee vragen probeert te behandelen:
The main question is:
What can Ukraine achieve, if it spends more manpower and equipment to take more border villages in the Kursk direction? There’s a limited amount of benefit to be gained from simply controlling more land. 10/
A larger land area would, of course, have more weight in possible peace negotiations in the future. Even if Ukraine were to reach the Rylsk-Korenevo-Sudzha line, it would likely still be less valuable than many of the territories currently occupied by Russia in Ukraine. 11/ Image
Some have argued that expanding the zone of control could force the Russians to shift their focus to Kursk at the expense of other directions, because of political reasons. I’m not entirely convinced the Russians will do this, as there are other possible scenarios too. 12/
It’s possible that the Russians would try to freeze the front and let Ukraine stay in the occupied area, assuming that the issue of a few dozen towns and villages can be solved in future negotiations, as the priority is to achieve the set political goals inside Ukraine. 13/
In this situation, some additional Ukrainian forces would be tied to guard and hold an expanded secondary direction, while the fight in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv would continue just as intensively. 14/
The Kursk offensive is increasingly beginning to look like a medium risk – medium reward operation. There’s no massive game-changing objectives to be achieved, but there’s also no likely catastrophes on the horizon. 15/
The best case scenario for Ukraine would probably be the following:
Russia decides it’s not acceptable to leave any areas to Ukrainian hands, and will divert significant resources even from the most critical places and to get every square kilometre back, despite the losses. 16/
This would severely attrit the Russians, ease the pressure in other directions, and maybe even make it possible for Ukrainians to improve the tactical situation locally in the east. However, as usual, the reality will most likely set somewhere in between. 17/
Regardless of whether the Ukrainians continue their advance, they have proved that occupation of relatively large areas is no longer a privilege of Russia. The war is now even more concretely a war on Russian soil as well, and Russia must take this into account in many ways. 18/
(Dikgedrukt door mij.)
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1822674819587944804.html
Dan nog deze. Heb er niets aan toe te voegen, behalve dat ik geen vertaling heb gelezen: