Normaal geen fan van de Oekraïense Pravda, maar ze lijken een uitstekend artikel te hebben uitgebracht over het Pokrovsk front. Het is een vrij in-depth analyse over de gebeurtenissen, moeilijkheden, maar ook een mooi verhaal over het breken van een omsingeling voor Oekraïne aan de belangrijkste front in deze oorlog.
Infantry war at Pokrovsk: why Ukraine's key eastern front started (and continues) to crumble
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/
Je moet er even voor zitten, en zelf geven ze ook de volgende inleiding
This is a long article, so I’ll keep the introduction brief.
This is the story of how within six months, the Russian army has advanced 30 km from Avdiivka towards one of the largest and most strategic cities in Donetsk Oblast, one that until recently was far removed from the war: Pokrovsk.
We’ll ask whether this advance could have been prevented and what role Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has played.
The names and positions of most of the sources cited in this article have been omitted at their request. Only a handful are rank-and-file soldiers; the majority are officers, battalion commanders, and deputy commanders.
This article is written with respect and gratitude towards every soldier, and especially every infantryman and woman, who defended the Pokrovsk front, and in the hope that the mistakes made there will never be repeated.
Onderstaande dingen vond ik interessant:
The rotation of military units is one of the most vulnerable defence areas in general, and for the Ukrainian army in particular, and the Russians took advantage of that.
We met guys from the 68th who had only just taken up their positions and were forced to retreat immediately because of the FPV drone attacks. When a brigade leaves, they take all the electronic warfare equipment with them. This is typical on this front: they [the Russians] advance the most during rotations. The occupiers take advantage of those times."
Rusland heeft tot tweemaal toe (Ochteryne en Prohres) gebruik kunnen maken van het wisselen van Oekraïense troepen. Het feit dat EW apparatuur wordt gewisseld lijkt me wel erg kwalijk - hiermee geef je Russische FPV operators wel erg veel kansen.
There are densely planted trees and shrubs all along the railway line, making it easier for the Russians to amass larger units there prior to launching assaults. The foliage made it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to detect these build-ups of Russian troops and deploy artillery or drones to neutralise them. Given that the Russians mostly deployed infantry in the area, it was the most effective tactic they could have chosen.
"In order to stop the Russians as they advanced along the railway line, we should have set up barricades and rigged those areas with explosives. We should have cut down the dense woods to create clear lines of sight. We didn’t start doing that until around Zhelanne!
Zelf heb ik het ook een paar keer gezegd, de Russische opmars volgt de spoorlijn naar Pokrovsk. Aan beide kanten heb je langs de rails bomenrijen wat verkenning en FPV drone aanvallen bemoeilijkt. De nieuwe thermite drones van Oekraïne waren handig geweest een paar maanden terug.
"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade – ed.] responded: ‘We have forces there, they’re all there.’
Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields – but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we’re seeing now."
Een disconnect tussen de troepen op de grond en de bevelhebbers. Nu is dit nog waarschijnlijk een veel groter probleem bij de Russen. Het zal waarschijnlijk zo'n overblijfsel zijn van hoe de Sovjets het deden.
Over the past six months, the Russian army has created, developed and, worst of all, held a huge salient – 30 km long and 20 km wide – between Avdiivka and Pokrovsk. On a map of the front, it immediately catches the eye.
The soldiers half-jokingly refer to such salients as "pisiuns" (penises) between themselves, Vitalii tells Ukrainska Pravda.
"What the Russians do is to advance a kilometre in one place and form a pisiun, then [do the same] a little to the right/left, [to form] another pisiun. Then they bring in infantry and weapons, and then they lock in those who are between these two salients.
Their typical tactic is: cut off – close in. And these salients have to be cut off immediately, at the root. Due to insufficient military assets and communication between [Ukrainian] units, this was not possible."
De Russische tactiek van salients creëren - Dit is hoe ze langzaam maar zeker steeds meer terrein winnen, en dat voornamelijk aan de zuid kant van het Pokrovsk front.
Pravda geeft vervolgens een aantal redenen waarom de Russen op dit front aan het winnen zijn. Zeker even lezen in het artikel zelf:
- Russia’s superiority in terms of manpower, artillery and guided aerial bombs
- The lack of soldiers, especially experienced, trained and motivated ones
- Faulty fortifications
First, Ukraine’s defence forces did not send all of their soldiers to Kursk Oblast. None of the brigades defending the Pokrovsk front were relocated to Russia during the Kursk campaign.
The one exception, as Ukrainska Pravda recently discovered, is the third battalion of the 80th Separate Galician Air Assault Brigade, which had been holding the defence of Krasnohorivka until the Kursk offensive began. But although some consider Krasnohorivka to be part of the Pokrovsk front, it is (both officially and in actual fact) on the Kurakhove front.
Op 1 uitzondering na zou Oekraïne zelf geen troepen uit Pokrovsk weggehaald hebben om mee te doen in Koersk. Volgens de WSJ / NY Times zou dit wel het geval zijn, dus ik vraag mij een beetje af wie hier gelijk heeft.
However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.
Another figure – the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine’s General Staff – confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly – on average from 40 to 52 per day.
Russia clearly did not withdraw any troops from the nearby Kurakhove front, where the number of clashes per day rose from 14 to 20. Assaults on the Kupiansk and Lyman fronts also increased.
Sadly, the Kursk operation has not yet aided the defence forces in Pokrovsk, although it’s unlikely to have weakened them either.
It’s worth noting, however, that Russia will undoubtedly require additional reserves to mount assaults on major settlements like Selydove, Myrnohrad, or Pokrovsk itself. It is these reserves that the defence forces are currently attempting to hammer in Kursk Oblast.
Rusland weigerde het spelletje van Oekraïne mee te spelen. Het was een gok om in Koersk te gaan vechten, maar ik denk dat we ondertussen wel kunnen veronderstellen dat het een prima idee was (gezien nu rond de 50k Russische soldaten vechten - en dus niet kunnen mee doen aan een aanval op de grote steden zelf.
En een afsluitend woord over de toekomst van Pokrovsk:
Is there any chance that Pokrovsk could be saved?
Several officers told Ukrainska Pravda they believe the city will suffer the same fate as Bakhmut: several months of intense fighting that will raze another of Donetsk Oblast’s settlements to the ground.
A few, particularly Serhii Filimonov, Commander of the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, remain more optimistic, convinced that even in these conditions there is room for manoeuvre. One option – by no means the only one – is to cut through the Pokrovsk salient on two sides and encircle the Russian group.
"There are weak points where enemy units have been hammered. It’s clear where these are, where they are building up forces, and what their next steps will be. There are a lot of prisoners, and everything is known. The question is assets and personnel," Filimonov believes.
Well, sir, on first sighting the French, I naturally gave the order to advance. That's my style, sir.