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Silent7 Allereerst even mijn complimenten voor je initiatief!
Voordat je een Ripple effect kan vaststellen moet de uitgangssituatie vastgesteld zijn.
En welk tijdstip kiezen we voor het uitgangspunt? Dit is geen ontmoediging, maar wel een reden om te bedenken wat we precies willen weten.
Een ander issue is informatie. We zijn redelijk geïnformeerd over de Russische "defensie" (offensie?). Desondanks draait de BTG-goochelact rondjes om onze defensie analisten. Als ik een reden zou kunnen bedenken voor de introductie van de BTG dan alleen die goochelelact er al een. De BTG als de virtualisatie van een strijdmacht.
De informatie vanuit Afrika zal schetsmatiger zijn. Ook dit is geen ontmoediging, we moeten er wel op voorbereid zijn. Bovendien lijkt Afrika de Noordpool wel. De Amerikanen roeren zich daar, de Russen en vooral de Chinezen zijn daar aanwezig. De invloed van Europa en UK staat hierdoor onder druk. Zonder verder onderzoek is mijn impressie dat de Chinezen het meest succesvol zijn met het uitbreiden van hun invloed.
Ook ik vind geen snelle antwoorden, wel wat bronnen met lappen tekst.
Een van die bronnen komt van het in Washington gesitueerde Africa Center (het zoveelste strategic study center) moet er mede voor zorgen dat de VS goed in de smiezen heeft hoe haar invloed in Africa zich verhoudt to de invloed van de andere partijen. Wat bronnen die ik zo even snel vind zijn:
Africa center: Russia’s Strategic Goals in Africa
Enkele informatieve gedeelten uit dit document:
After a year-long siege of Tripoli in western Libya, warlord Khalifa Haftar and his forces beat a hasty retreat in mid-2020 from their collapsing front lines to territory controlled by his proxy coalition of tribal groups and militias in central and eastern Libya. Along with them were an estimated 1,200 Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group. They were in Libya as part of a Russian gambit to carve out a zone of influence in this geographically strategic territory linking Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Russia has been supporting Haftar’s forces with snipers, Mig-29 and Su-24 fighter jets, SA-22 surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft systems, and hundreds of flights delivering military logistics since 2019.1 Despite the military setback, and subsequent ceasefire and formation of a fragile Government of National Unity, Russia is on track to achieve its key objectives including gaining revenues from oil fields in eastern Libya, naval access to deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean, and establishing itself as a powerbroker in a region bordering NATO’s southern flank.
Waar Rusland mee bekend is (Tsjetsjenië) is dat je door setbacks heen moet kijken. Dat lijkt in Libië een goed ding.
Russia’s strategy in Africa is both opportunistic and calculating. It is opportunistic in that it is willing to take risks and quickly deploy mercenary forces to crisis contexts when the opening presents itself, similar to what Moscow did in Syria. It is calculating in that it aims to expand Russia’s power projection including over strategic chokeholds in the eastern Mediterranean and Suez Canal that could affect NATO force deployments in times of crisis.
It is further calculating in that it sees Africa as a way to balance Western influence through what amounts to asymmetric tactics. Moscow’s forays into Africa extend the geostrategic playing field. Russia has similarly recognized the polarizing effect that large inflows of Syrian refugees have had on European politics. Keeping a hand on the spigot regulating refugee flows from Africa, therefore, provides Russia further leverage over Europe.
TradeRussia has gained outsized influence in Africa in recent years by playing the cards it has well. Where it has realized most influence—Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Mali—Russia has agilely employed a combination of mercenary and disinformation interventions in support of isolated leaders or proxies.
WagnerMercenaries from the Wagner Group (closely tied to Russia’s military intelligence agency, GRU) have been deployed in Libya, CAR, Sudan, and Mozambique. In each case, following the Syrian model, the Russians supported a beleaguered leader facing a security challenge in a geographically strategic country with mineral or hydrocarbon assets.
Russia struck a deal with the elected president of CAR, Faustin-Archange Touadéra in 2018, to help stave off a threat from the Islamist Seleka militia groups. An estimated 400 Wagner troops were deployed to northern CAR. A Russian, Valery Zakharov, became Touadéra’s national security advisor[/li]
[...]
Reports suggest Wagner simultaneously negotiated a revenue-sharing deal with the rebels while gaining control of lucrative gold and diamond mines in the north.5 Wagner was also involved in repelling a separate rebel offensive on Bangui following flawed elections in December 2020 that kept Touadéra in power with active Russian backing.
In Sudan, Russia was a backer of longtime dictator Omer al-Bashir. This included the deployment of Wagner forces to support the Sudanese military while gaining access to gold mines in the west of the country. When Bashir was faced with nationwide protests in 2019, the Wagner Group reportedly advised Bashir to crack down harshly on the protesters. Russia appears to have maintained influence with the military leaders who ultimately toppled Bashir, including maintaining previously negotiated mining agreements.
There are also reports of Wagner having deployed to assist the Mozambican government respond to the rapidly expanding militant Islamist group threat in the north. Non-coincidentally, the region is home to a multibillion-dollar gem mining operation and liquefied national gas reserves.
Disinformation campaignsIn the aftermath of the August 18, 2020 coup in Mali[...]some of those celebrating were waving Russian flags[....]identical pre-printed posters celebrating Malian-Russian cooperation[...]photos of Vladimir Putin, and messages thanking Russia for its support
The most well-documented instance of Russian disinformation in Africa is in Libya. Starting in January 2019, criticisms of the West, the United Nations, and the UN-backed Government of National Accord became common on Libyan social media networks. The same pages and users praised Russia’s role as a stabilizing actor.[...]Investigative analysis by Stanford’s Internet Observatory working with Facebook and Twitter was able to identify dozens of social media accounts with hundreds of thousands of followers that presented themselves as authentic domestic voices
Russia’s disinformation efforts have begun “franchising” their model by creating or sponsoring African hosts for the pro-Russian and anti-West messaging.[...]Disinformation operations [...]have now been seen in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique and Zimbabwe[...]In South Africa, Russian-sponsored messaging has attempted to inflame racial tensions.
Disinformation messaging is, at times, linked to broader diplomatic support to help friendly African regimes remain in power. As Guinean President Alpha Conde was seeking an unconstitutional third term, Russian Ambassador Alexander Bregadze said on national television in 2019 that rotating leaders was not necessarily a good thing and that “Constitutions are no dogma, Bible, or Koran…It’s constitutions that adapt to reality, not reality to constitutions.”11 Russia’s biggest aluminum producer, Rusal, has expansive bauxite mining interests in Guinea.