IPSEC kan inderdaad niet altijd door een firewall aangezien de source en destination wordt gechecked of deze kloppen. Als deze door een firewall wordt gemangeld dat worden deze pakketten gedropped door de ontvanger. Ik weet niet zeker of het voor beide geld (AH en ESP) maar daar ben ik zo achter aangezien ik er momenteel mee bezig ben om het uit te zoeken.
om over de Authentication Header (AH) en Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) protocol wat uit te wijden:
http://vpn.shmoo.com/vpn/FAQ.htmlHow does IPsec work with network address translation (NAT)?
NAT is incompatible with Authentication Header protocol, whether used in transport or tunnel mode. An IPsec VPN using AH protocol digitally signs the outbound packet, both data payload and headers, with a hash value appended to the packet. When using AH protocol, packet contents (the data payload) are not encrypted.
Why this bothers NAT is the last part: a NAT device in between the IPsec endpoints will rewrite either the source or destination address with one of its own choosing. The VPN device at the receiving end will verify the integrity of the incoming packet by computing its own hash value, and will complain that the hash value appended to the received packet doesn't match. The VPN device at the receiving end doesn't know about the NAT in the middle, so it assumes that the data has been altered for nefarious purposes.
IPsec using Encapsulating Security Payload in tunnel mode encapsulates the entire original packet (including headers) in a new IP packet. The new IP packet's source address is the outbound address of the sending VPN gateway, and its destination address is the inbound address of the VPN device at the receiving end. When using ESP protocol with authentication, the packet contents (in this case, the entire original packet) are encrypted. The encrypted contents, but not the new headers, are signed with a hash value appended to the packet.
This mode (tunnel mode ESP with authentication) is compatible with NAT, because integrity checks are performed over the combination of the "original header plus original payload," which is unchanged by a NAT device. Transport mode ESP with authentication is also compatible with NAT, but is not often used by itself. Since the hash is computed only over the original payload, original headers may be rewriten.
In addition, NAT may interfere with IPSec (both ESP and AH) if it prevents the two VPN gateways from successfully negotiating SAs using ISAKMP/IKE with certificates. X.509 certificates are signed by a trusted third party (called a Certificate Authority) in order to bind a user's or device's public key to some other identifying public characteristic. Once common identifying characteristic used for VPN gateway devices is external IP address.